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ABSTRACT
The assignment examines the policy positions of the Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU) on restructuring and privatisation.
The assignment's theoretical point of departure is found in the work of Levitsky and
Way (1998). Levitsky and Way (1998) examines the alliance between a political party
and its labour ally in the context of neo-liberal economic reform. The context is
usually a political party that has come to power with the aid of a powerful trade union
federation. The authors are interested in establishing if the party-union alliance would
be sustained if the political party embarks on drastic economic reforms that have the
potential to undermine trade union federations. The two cases that are investigated are
Poland and Argentina, because in both these cases, a political party has been swept
into power with the aid of a powerful trade union federation. Against the background
of neo-liberal economic reforms, both trade union federations initially supported the
economic reforms. In the medium and long term however, labour defected from the
alliance in Poland, whereas the alliance was sustained in Argentina despite the
enormous costs to workers.
Levitsky and Way (1998) then posit a number of material and institutional factors that
explain both the initial convergence and the later divergence between the two test
cases. The factors that are included in this framework are social linkages, party
strength, leadership overlap, union competition and the degree of autonomy from
either party leadership or the rank-and-file. These factors are hypothesised to explain
the policy positions and behaviour of the trade union federation. It is this theoretical
framework, which will be tested to establish if the framework permits enough
conceptual leverage to explain the past and present policy positions of COSATU on
privatisation. These factors have been given prominence because of its actual bearing
on the status of the alliance relationship. The present study will therefore be using
these factors of the framework, and barring one exception, it will be conceptualised in
the same way.
The second component of the study is to use the South African National Opinion
Leader Survey of 1997/98 to study the actual attitudes and opinions of COSATU
leaders on a range of privatisation issues. The survey is going to be used to determine
if there is any degree of continuity between formal congress resolutions and the
attitudes of COSATU leaders in the survey. This is also an indirect way of verifying
the ideological loyalty of leaders to the official positions of the trade union federation.
The second question returns to the alliance relationship by examining differences, if
any between COSATU and ANC leaders on privatisation related issues.
Factor analysis is used to build two indexes, namely a "privatisation index" and a
"gear index." An interesting finding from the data is the relatively greater policy
cohesion amongst COSATU leaders. These results permit speculations that do not
necessarily indicate an imminent breaking up of the alliance, but rather continued
discussions with possibly various policy compromises by COSATU and the ANC.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
OPSOMMING
Die werkstuk ondersoek die beleids posisie van die Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU) oor herstrukturering en privatisering in Suid Afrika.
Die werkstuk se teoretiese uitgangspunt word in die werk van Levitsky en Way
gevind (1998). Hierdie skrywers ondersoek die alliansie tussen 'n politieke party en sy
arbeids vennoot in die konteks van neo-liberale ekonomiese hervorming. Die konteks
is 'n politieke party wat aan bewind gekom het met die steun van 'n kragtige vakbond-
federasie. Die skrywers wil vas te stelof die party-vakbond-alliansie sal voortgaan
wanneer die politieke party drastiese ekonomiese hervorming aanpak wat die
potensiaal het om vakbond federasies te ondermyn. Twee gevalle, naamlik Pole en
Argentinië word ondersoek. In albei gevalle het die regerende politieke party aan
bewind gekom met die hulp van die vakbond federasie. Teen hierdie agtergrond van
neo-liberale hervorming het albei vakbond federasies in Pole en Argentinië
aanvanklik die proses gesteun. Gedurende hierdie tydperk het vakbonde in Pole
weggebreek van die alliansie, terwyl die alliansie in Argentinië ten spyte van die groot
koste vir die werkers voortgesit was.
Levitsky en Way (1998) verskaf 'n aantal materiële en institusionele faktore wat die
aanvanklike samevloeiing en die latere uiteenvloeiing in hul twee voorbeelde kan
verduidelik. Die faktore wat in die ontleding gebruik word is sosiale verbindinge,
partysterkte, leierskap oorvleueling, vakbond kompetisie en outonomie van of party
leierskap en gewone werkers. Volgens die skrywers se hipotese sal hierdie faktore die
beleidsposisies van die vakbond federasie verklaar. Dit is hierdie teoretiese raamwerk
wat in die studie gebruik word. Daar word gepoog om vas te stelof hierdie raamwerk
genoegsame konseptuele reikwydte het om COSATU se privatiserings beleid te
verduidelik.
Die tweede komponent van die studie is die gebruik van die Suid Afrikaanse
Nasionale Menings Opname van 1997/98. Dit word gebruik om die houdings en die
opinies van COSATU leiers oor n breë spektrum van privatiserings kwessies te
ondersoek. Die doel is om vas te stelof daar enige graad van kontinuïteit tussen
formele kongres resolusies en houdings van COSATU leiers bestaan. Dit is ook 'n
manier om die "ideologiese getrouheid" van COSATU leiers te verifieer. Tweedens
word daar teruggekeer na die alliansie verhouding deur die verskille tussen ANC en
COSATU leiers betreffende privatiserings verwante kwessies te ondersoek.
Faktor ontleding word gebruik om twee indekse te bou, naamlik 'n "Privatiserings
indeks" en 'n "Gear-indeks". Interessante bevindinge wat dui op 'n groter
beleidskohesie by Cosatu-meningsvormers as by ANC-meningsvormers kom na vore.
Na aanleiding van bogenoemde model word daar gespekuleer dat hierdie
meningspatrone nie noodwendig op 'n uiteenval van die alliansie dui nie, maar eerder
op voortgesette gesprekke met verskeie beleidskompromisse by Cosatu sowel as die
ANC-leierskap.
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1CHAPTER 1: PRIVATISATION AND ITS COMBATANTS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The South African industrial and labour landscape is enveloped in a battle about the
restructuring of state assets and in particular the contested issue of privatisation.
The recent standoff between labour and the state parastatal Spoornet over
retrenchment proposals has brought to the fore trade union reaction to privatisation in
its various guises (Grawitzky, 1999; Lambert, 1999). Organised labour has threatened
mass action if its proposals are not going to be given serious consideration. In another
much-publicised situation, local public sector trade unions in Johannesburg are in
vociferous disagreement with the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (JMC) about
the latter's plan to privatise and corparatise some of its functions. The JMC has
decided in a policy called Igoli 2002 to sell the Johannesburg Stadium, Metro Gas and
the Rand Airport (Xundu, 1999; Xako, 1999). There are also plans to get private
companies to manage the public transport system and the Johannesburg zoo.
One of the interesting aspects of this situation is the fact that the African National
Congress (ANC) dominated Metropolitan Council is not willing to deviate from the
mentioned policy plans (Xundu, 1999). A councillor of the Johannesburg
Metropolitan Council who had publicly spoken out about the policy was suspended as
the ANC's chairperson in the northern sub-region. The Johannesburg Council's
labour relations specialist said that unions should not confuse the issues of policy, the
council's right to govern and labour relations (Xundu, 1999). The chairperson of the
ANC in Johannesburg has echoed the same point of view, and it would appear as if
the concerns of the South African Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU) are going to
be settled through mediation. These two situations offer dramatic evidence of the state
of relations between the labour unions and the ANC government.
In both these instances, trade unions are calling on the various employer organisations
to honour the agreements of the National Framework Agreement (NFA) (Msomi,
1999). The NFA is an agreement, which emanated out of discussions that were held
between organised labour and government on the restructuring and the privatisation of
state assets. The Spoornet trade unions are accusing the management of Spoornet of
using the NFA to convey decisions of management, instead of following the processes
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2laid out in the NFA (Msomi, 1999). SAMWU, in its battle with the Johannesburg
Council is alleging that the Council does not follow the NFA, which provides for the
public sector as a preferred provider (Xako, 1999). Itwas not so long ago when some
labour commentators and SAMWU were arguing for the abandonment of the NFA,
because it was interpreted as binding the unions to privatisation (Ray, 1997: 11; van
Driel, 1998: 61). Ray (1997) interprets the NFA as the abandonment of transformation
as envisaged in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and an
acceptance of the gradual privatisation programmes. Van Driel '(1998: 62) states
unequivocally that unions that are bound to the NFA are promoting privatisation, and
cites the existence of union investment arms as evidence of this position.
These criticisms levelled against the NFA are not restricted to the trade unions alone.
The Democratic Party (DP) has urged government to scrap the NFA as it only slows
down the restructuring and privatisation process (Ensor, 1999). Adding to this
complexity, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has called for
the re-negotiation of the NFA to prevent politicians and the managers of parastatals
abusing this instrument (COSATU, 1999). The point that is given limpid expression
to in the instances above is the essentially contested nature of the privatisation
process. Contestation of the privatisation policy has its primary roots in the fact that
no significant role player is absolutely certain about the socio-economic results of the
privatisation process.
Organised labour's most important concerns are the fear of job losses and lack of
service delivery (Chotia, 1999). The Secretary-General of the South African
Communist Party (SACP), Blade Nzimande said that the sale of state assets would fail
to improve the living conditions of the people in South Africa. He advocates an
activist state that would deliver "an all-round development offensive" meeting the
needs of ordinary people (Chotia, 1999). The Minister of Public Enterprise has also
expressed similar concerns about the negative consequences of restructuring and
privatisation.
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3Jeff Radebe, the Minister of Public Enterprises said that government still has to make
a decision whether to take the privatisation process to its full consequences (Chalmer,
1999). This has come out most clearly in the recent Spoornet saga when the
department's spokesperson said that government has yet to take a final decision on the
retrenchment of workers (Grawitzky, 1999). The Deputy-President of South Africa
had raised similar concerns when he noted that an overhaul of government's
economic policy would not be a painless process. This change, the Deputy-President
ascribed directly to the change in the ANC's policy framework (Haffejee, 1999). The
article reports that the Deputy-President had apparently been rebuked for his candour.
Alec Irwin, the Minister of Trade and Industry has said that the restructuring policies
will result in short-term pain, but will eventually end up in long-term gain. Labour is
increasingly drawing fire to oppose the privatisation policies, because they argue that
most of the government's macro-economic initiatives have not produced the desired
results (Horton et al., 1998: 16). These commentators are referring to the increasing
unemployment rate, reduced stable capital inflows and an ailing gross domestic
product. I
Government's macro-economic framework, the Growth Employment and
Redistribution policy (Gear) has been systematically attacked by the trade unions as
lying at the roots of the economic problems. The argument is that the ANC has wilted
from the pressure of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and
accordingly changed its policies to that of Gear and privatisation (Harvey, 1999). The
National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) has shown that the
Gear policy has virtually failed in every major respect, and that there is a need for a
new macro-economic framework (Harvey, 1999).1t is difficult to establish if this is
1 Real GDP growth declined from 4.2% in 1996 to 0.5% in 1998. From 1998 to 1999, the year on -year
growth is only 1 per cent. This is below the average 3.3% projection of Gear. Unemployment: due to
the cyclical changes in 1996, non-agricultural employment declined by 1.7% in 1997 and 3.7% in
1998. This is also far from the 6% employment growth projection of Gear. Net Capital Inflows: We
are still dependent on portfolio capital inflows. Net inflow for 1998 was R20.3 billion against the R46.7
billion for first three quarters in 1999. Foreign direct investments still show a net outflow ofR6.5
billion in 1998 and R3.3 billion in fust three quarters of 1999. The economy is not yet attracting
significant long-term stable capital flows (South African Reserve Bank, MarchIDecember 1999).
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4one of the reasons why the government has moved cautiously in the implementation
of the privatisation policies. The same author argues that the recent wage dispute and
the Spoomet saga can be traced back to Gear (Harvey, 1999). Gear as an economic
policy, demands that both the public service and the state owned enterprises must
become more competitive, and therefore resulting in plans to retrench workers. The
current premier of the Gauteng, when still secretary-general of COSATU, has
attacked Gear for its inability to create jobs and for the fact that it imposes restrictive
fiscal and monetary policies (COSATU, 1997). These conflicts have had a definite
bearing on the alliance between organised labour and the ANC-dominated
government. Haffejee (1999) says that the alliance between the ANC, COSATU and
the SACP will not fall apart as the latter two partners are seen as needing the ANC.
According to Haffejee (1999), policy directions will still be fought within the
tripartite alliance.
The retrenchment of workers in the public sector, and specifically the state parastatals
is viewed by COSATU as a corollary of government's macro-economic policies.' The
federation believed, then, that ministers in the cabinet are taking most of the policy
decisions. At its latest special congress, COSATU came out strongly in support of the
alliance. This strategic affirmation is important because it emphasises the sharing of a
common vision and objectives as crucial for the alliance relationship (COSATU,
1999). The labour federation still seems to think that the drive for the restructuring
and privatisation programmes comes from individual ministers disconnected from
alliance structures. The affirmation of the alliance effectively calls for a strengthening
of the traditional democratic structures in the organisations.
The labour federation wants the decisions of individual ministers to be scrutinised by
a newly formed alliance structure, and this in itself reflects the deep distrust of current
tendencies in ANC leadership. The alliance relationship between the ANC and
2 Public sector unemployment is put at between 170000 and 370 000 jobs lost in the period 1994 to
1999, Roberts, A. (1999) "Spare us from the collective twaddle" Financial Mail, 21 May 1999. Total
unemployment is estimated at between 30-40% of the workforce. From March 1996 to March 1999,
with the exception of the wholesale and retail traders, all sectors have suffered job losses (Horton,
1999). Figures from Horton (1999) are based on Statistics South Africa's databases.
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5COSATU is vital in the context of the ANC government's drive to speed up the
privatisation programme. There are indications that the Public Enterprise ministry
plans to introduce legislation detailing a new legal framework that will regulate all
state owned enterprises (Chalmers, 1999; Block and Soggot, 1999). Any tensions in
the relationship will be reflected in the willingness of labour to acquiesce in the
decisions of the government. Fundamental differences are likely to lead to a lack of
consensus on all the major privatisation issues, and this would negatively impact on
the ability of government to implement these programmes. In most of the discussions
about restructuring, commentators have constantly indicated that the fortunes of these
programmes are inseparable from the present state of the alliance relationship.
In order to conceptualise the alliance relationship, the next section will examine a
theoretical framework that proposes certain variables impacting on the alliance
relationship. The implicit assumption is that a sound relationship facilitates the
acceptance of harsh restructuring decisions.
1.2 THE DYNAMICS OF LABOUR BACKED ADJUSTMENT
It is impossible to derive policy outcomes from economic cleavages and interests
alone without a consideration of the institutional context in which groups operate
(Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 7).
In their investigation of the factors that impact on the party-union relationship,
Levitsky and Way (1998) focus attention very strongly on institutional factors as well.
Their argument in brief suggests that during the initial period of reform, labour
acquiescence must be understood as a product of social linkages, shared identities and
networks of close personal ties. They argue that social linkages may explain short-
term processes, but it is not sufficient to sustain labour-government co-operation over
the long haul (Levitsky and Way, 1998: 172). In order to explain why some alliances
succeed, while others fail, they focus on elements of the political and institutional
context in which trade union leaders operate.
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6These factors are (1) the strength of the governing party; (2) the level of union
competition; (3) organisational overlap between union and party, and (4) the
autonomy of the leadership from party and the rank and file (Levitsky and Way, 1998:
172). Levitsky and Way (1998) examine each of these factors in the context of
Poland, Argentina and Spain.'
The 1989 elections brought labour-backed parties into power in Argentina and
Poland. Both these powerful trade unions federations were unwilling to oppose the
initial economic reforms. President Menen immediately slashed public spending,
deregulated the economy, privatised state enterprises, liberalised trade and introduced
flexible labour market policies. His government also banned strikes in a wide range of
public services, encouraged decentralised bargaining and relaxed union control over
insurance and pension schemes. The new Polish government towards the end of 1989
dismantled central elements of the state-run economy, eliminated price controls, cut
the public budget, and drastically reduced subsidies and trade barriers. Important for
the workers, the Polish government enacted strict wage control levels and attacked
centralised collective bargaining in favour of direct negotiations with regional unions.
In both Poland and Argentina, the initial reforms imposed very high costs on the
working and the poor. In Argentina, in the period between 1988 to 1995, 300 000
public sector jobs were lost, real wages were squeezed and public sector and industrial
unions' membership was destroyed by 50%. In Poland, both the gross domestic
product and real wages declined in 1990/91, and in less than two years,
unemployment rose from near zero to 11.6%. In 1994, the real unemployment figure
surpassed 16%.
It should be remembered that both the Argentina General Confederation of Workers
(CGT) and Solidarity union (SU) were very powerful as their showdown with hostile
governments has shown. These anti-labour policies devastated large segments not
only of the union membership, but it also imposed hardships on both the employed
3 The reference is to Levitsky and Way (1998) unless otherwise indicated.
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7and the unemployed. In spite of these policies the bulk of labour in Poland and
Argentina supported the ruling party. The bulk of the CGT-union campaigned for the
Partido Justicialista (PJ) party in the 1991 legislative elections. A pro-market
intelligentsia came to power in Poland in 1989 and Solidarity union immediately
called for a moratorium on all protest and strikes to allow the new government to
settle in (Levitsky and Way, 1998: 175). The initial support for these anti-labour
policies is explained on the basis of social linkages, shared social networks and
common identities. In Argentina, a Peronist political identity remains strong both
among union leadership and the rank-and-file membership. The existence of strong
personal relationships between trade union federation and party had been forged
during periods of shared adversity and struggle against military rule. These personal
relationships facilitated material exchanges between Menen and key union leaders. In
Poland there were strong social linkages between the Polish intelligentsia and the
working class during years of opposition to the Communists.
After the election of Gonzalez into power, UGT accepted that economic adjustments
and restructuring were unavoidable if the economy were to be put on a sounder
footing. The union had to pay the price of wage restraint and the reduction of excess
labour. Levitsky and Way (1998) note that in all these cases, the long years of co-
operation between party and union appear to be critical in the union's acceptance of
initial government economic reforms. It however remains a fact that the alliance
between party and union lasted in Argentina, but it fell apart in Poland and Spain.
Levitsky and Way (1998) argue that the alliance must be situated in an institutional
The relationship developed in the 1970s under the auspices of the Workers' Defence
Committee. This organisation established by the intelligentsia co-ordinated
fundraising and assisted workers who were persecuted for strike activity. When the
newly elected Polish government introduced the neo-liberal economic reforms, strikes
were called off in response to appeals of civic responsibility (Levitsky and Way,
1998: 179). Solidarity union leaders saw this as responsibility towards their
constituencies and the country as a whole. A similar scenario is evident in Spain
where the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the General Workers' Union
(UGT) faced common adversity in the difficult Franco years (Gillespie, 1990: 48).
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8The PJ party won four successive elections since Menen took power in 1989. An
alternative party, FREPASO emerged in the 1995 elections, but the bulk of the labour
movement and working class voters remained with PJ. The very strength of the PJ
party and the potential costs of defection dissuaded almost all these voters to remain
in the party.
and organisational context that provides other, more material incentives to co-
operate. It is upon these factors that we focus our attention now.
The first factor is expounded in the following way:
"A strong governing party and the absence of a viable political alternative for
labour can be expected to encourage continued union co-operation" (Levitsky and
Way, 1998: 182).
The point that the authors make is if labour's allies are likely to remain in power in
the medium term, then union leaders will face a choice between co-operation and
political isolation. Labour is therefore less likely to pursue opposition strategies if
they are unable to spoil the governing party's electoral chances. Defection in this case
means forfeiture of political, material and organisational benefits. If on the other
hand, the governing party is electorally vulnerable, opposition strategies are more
fruitful. In Poland, the elections of 1990/91 revealed the Polish government's weak
base of support.
The leader of the Solidarity government, Mazowiecki came third behind the labour
leader Walesa and an unknown candidate. During 1991, the main Post-Solidarity
party received 12% of the vote against the 5% of Solidarity party. Furthermore, polls
that were conducted at the time showed high levels of dissatisfaction with economic
reforms, and when the party split into several different parties, Solidarity union was
weak and isolated and faced severe competition from more radical unions. In these
circumstances, they had few reasons to continue its support of the reform programme.
Argentina on the other hand is an example of party success.
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9The second factor deals with the level and intensity of competition that labour faces:
"Labour competition encourages the defection of unions aligned with a governing
party" (Levitsky and Way, 1998: 183).
The existence of more radical unions makes co-operation with devastating economic
reform more difficult. The issue is that unions must work harder to maintain its
members. Solidarity had to contend with two unions, namely OPZZ, founded by the
Communist Party, and a splinter union, Solidarity '80, a union that actively opposed
the neo-liberal economic reforms. OPZZ refused to obey the moratorium on strikes
called by Solidarity. The competitive environment at the plant level meant that
agreements made with one union could be challenged as selling workers short.
Solidarity union therefore sat with members it could no longer completely control,
and its calls for moderation were rejected.
The COT unions in Argentina face less competitive pressures because Argentinean
law permitted the existence of one official recognised labour federation (Levitsky and
Way, 1998: 183). A new union that strongly opposes the neo-liberal programme of
the Menen regime was found, but indications are that it will not effectively compete
with COT in the near future. The absence of severe competition creates the possibility
that the exchange between party and union leadership can continue undisturbed, and
this has an enormous moderating influence on the behaviour of unions.
The third factor deals with the degree of organisational fusion or overlap that exists
between party and the union:
"To the extent that unions are effectively integrated into the party leadership, labour
should defect more slowly from the governing alliance" (Levitsky and Way, 1998:
184).
Union leaders who are integrated in the party structures are hypothesised to have a
stake in the governing party's success. This would mean that union leaders are more
likely to favour co-operative strategies. If union leadership is poorly integrated into
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
10
the party system and structures, union leaders would see their interests as distinct
from the party, and here defection is more probable. The high initial overlap between
party and union in Poland declined after 1989. This low degree of party
institutionalism and fragmentation of the party system led to a system where
Solidarity union had its own representatives in parliament. Argentina by contrast has a
situation where the entire CGT leadership belongs to the PJ party, and many union
leaders held, are still holding positions and have aspirations to hold positions in the
party or in parliament. Levtisky and Way (1998) write that although the union
presence in the Peronist government were relatively low, organisational and
leadership overlap continue to exert a moderating influence on the union's strategy.
Solidarity union leaders are much more dependent on rank-and-file support than on
party and government support (Levitsky and Way, 1998: 185). With the collapse of
communism, the new Polish leaders did very little to institutionalise the exchange
between government and the unions. The democratic structures of Solidarity
The fourth factor affecting the destiny of the party-union relationship IS union
leadership autonomy from party and the rank-and-fiIe:
"Union responses to labour-backed adjustments are likely to be shaped by the degree
to which the privileges, positions, and power of labour leaders hinge on either the
discretion of government leaders or rank-and-file support" (Levitsky and Way, 1998:
184).
If the trade union federation is dependent on government for its financial survival,
legal recognition, intervention in industrial relations and access to the state, unions are
more likely to toe the official line of the state. If that same power is derived from the
support of workers on the shop floor, defection from the alliance is a greater
possibility. In Spain, the unions derive three quarters of its finances from members'
fees. This organisational independence from the PSOE party is counted as one of the
reasons why the distance has developed between party and union (Gillespie, 1990:
55).
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encouraged it to seek support from the rank-and-file, and so when the pressures came
to defect, Solidarity had little incentives to stay in the alliance. Argentina witnessed
low levels of union democracy and a reliance on party and state resources. It would
appear that there is a prioritising of the party-union relationship when the union's
dependence on the state is acute. A very small percentage of the main trade union
federation's income is derived from membership fees, and the government in
Argentina uses this to discipline recalcitrant unions and to reward co-operative ones.
In conclusion, Levitsky and Way (1998: 187) argue that both social linkages and
material-political incentive structures interact to shape unions' behaviour. Alliances
that are purely built on social linkages are not sufficient to sustain initial levels of co-
operation. The South African scenario, according to the authors will represent a test
case of the relative importance of the various elements of their framework. In
retrospect they leave the reader with the following statement:
[In] the current period of global austerity and adjustment, unions may be in a
better position to defend their interests when they are in opposition than when their
political allies are fnpower" (Levitsky and Way, 1998: 188).
In all of the above cases, it was the adoption of a new economic framework that
caused the initial spats between the party and the trade unions. The new economic
framework in both Poland and Argentina aimed at reducing the role of the state and to
try and create more space for the private sector. Government employment as we saw,
was one of the first casualties. Opposition to new economic policy was inevitably
centred on unemployment concerns. The unbanning of the ANC and the South
African Communist Party (SACP) in 1990 ushered in the tripartite-alliance between
the ANC, COSATU and the SACP.4 Prior to the 1994 elections, an extensive process
4 COSATU's national conference of 1987 represented an uneasy consensus when the federation
adopted the Freedom Charter and acknowledged that unions had a role to play in politics (Buhlungu,
1995: 89). Buhlungu (1995) writes that this accommodation laid the basis for the tripartite alliance. The
main question was not whether to support the ANC, but rather how to do it in a way that would benefit
COSATUand the ANC. Copelyn, a member of the South African Chemical Workers' Union
(SACTWU), expresses a different view when he argues that it is not clear whether the alliance between
the ANC and COSATU will promote greater unity between unions. He also questions the tactics of
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of consultation was started involving all the relevant constituencies of the three
different organisations. The purpose of these consultations was to identify the most
important social and economic needs in the various black communities in South
Africa. The upshot of these consultations was the publication of the Reconstruction
and Development Programme (RDP). This document conceptualised a very important
developmental role for the new South African State, and it became the basis of the
ANC's election campaign in 1994. Upon assuming power, the new government
unveiled its first plans to restructure and to privatise the major parastatals as early as
1995 (Makgetla, 1995: 65). This was followed by the publication of the new macro-
economic strategy Gear in 1996. The ANC's allies felt betrayed, because they were
not consulted, and because the new policies were in their eyes a betrayal of the social
and developmental role of the new state as laid out in the RDP.
The aim to understand the policy positions of COSATU on privatisation cannot
therefore be separated from investigating the context and substance of Gear. Many of
the differences between COSATU and government can be traced to their differences
on Gear. What follows is a brief review of the most important principles of the Gear
policy.
1.3 THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF GEAR
The Centre for Research into Economics and Finance in South Africa (CREFSA)
writes that the aim of Gear is to create a competitive, fast growing, employment-
creating economy capable of achieving the goals of the RDP (CREFSA, 1996: 19).
The growth rate of 3 per cent, then, was projected as unable to reverse the
unemployment trends in the economy. CREFSA (1996: 19) reports that the
framework is based on the co-operation of government, business and labour. The
main components of Gear are the following:
• A tighter fiscal stance, which aimed at reducing the deficit to 4% of GDP in
1997/98, and projected to fall to 3% by 1999/2000 (Gear, 1996: 12).
unionists who want to win greater influence in the ANC, because if this happens, then the electoral
appeal of the ANC would be narrowed (van Holdt, 1991: 29).
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5 The upshot of these plans was the Skills Development Act of 1998.
• Monetary and exchange rate policy: The main target is the consistent reduction
of inflation and the creation of the conditions for lower but positive real interest
rates (Gear, 1996: 12). Encouraging exporters, where the idea is to provide for an
effective exchange rate depreciation of 8.5%.
• Trade, industrial and small enterprise policy: An acceleration of the
programme of tariff reductions was proposed. Other plans aimed at the
development of small and medium sized firms and the development of industrial
cluster support programmes (CREFSA, 1996: 20).
• Public investment and asset restructuring: state assets are to be restructured in
terms of ownership and governance. A new policy regarding dividend payments to
the fiscus was also spelled out. (Gear, 1996: 5). CREFSA (1996: 20) indicates that
this programme stops short of announcing a large- scale privatisation programme.
This strategy re-iterated government's chosen public-private partnership approach
and the resulting preference for Strategic Equity Partners (SEP).
• Employment, wages and training: The main issues here were the promotion of
regulated labour market flexibility and the promotion of productivity
improvements aimed at skills development in both the formal and the informal
sectors (CREFSA, 1996: 20). 5 The chief function of labour market flexibility was
to prevent wage agreements from being extended to other industries and regions.
• A national social agreement: The Gear strategy is by definition a co-ordinated
strategy in that it requires the co-operation of business, labour and government. It
is interesting that the National Economic Development and Labour Council
(NADLEC) had been established for this purpose, but it is difficult to speak of a
national social agreement in South Africa.
The strategy to restructure state assets became one of the most contested issues
between government and its alliance partners. CREFSA (1996: 20) warned then that
this strategy required detailed co-ordination, and government was urged to deal with
this potentially explosive situation carefully. Government and its alliance partners
were locked in battle over this issue in spite of the bilateral agreement between it and
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
14
organised labour. Retrospectively, with labour, established big business, and black
business all involved, it is not clear if government was fully aware of the
contradictory demands that its privatisation programme would unleash (Simkins,
1997: 8). It is against this background that this assignment will try and analyse the
positions of COSATU on restructuring and privatisation.
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The study that I am undertaking does not deal in essence with the fate or the destiny
of the party-labour alliance, but the framework of Levitsky and Way (1998) will be
tested to establish its relevance in South Africa. One of the central objectives in the
study by Levitsky and Way (1998) is to identify the factors that impact on the
behaviour and consequent policy positions of trade unions. These factors have been
identified in the context of the alliance relationship and against the backdrop of the
implementation of neo-liberal economic reform. The study that the present author is
undertaking focuses on only one element of the neo-liberal economic programme,
namely privatisation. This would not, however, seriously prevent the application of
this framework, which originally is applied to neo-liberal economic reform per se.
The primary purpose of the study is to explain the positions and behaviour of
organised labour on privatisation in South Africa. COSATU is in alliance with the
governing party, and this, I would argue have serious implications for the federation's
position on privatisation, which is an important sub-component of economic reform.
The ultimate positions adopted by the federation cannot be separated from a
consideration of the context of the alliance relationship as predicted by the five
variables in the proposed theory. The potential explanatory power of all the factors in
this theory will be investigated separately, as well as the usefulness of the framework
as such. This will be followed by an analysis of the opinions of COSATU leaders and
ANC leaders in the South African National Leadership Opinion Survey of 1997/98.
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This study is therefore guided by the following questions:
How well does the proposed theoretical framework explain labour's current policy
positions and behaviour regarding privatisation'i
Levitsky and Way (1998: 176) are of the opinion that unions" do not always engage in
action to expand their power, or perhaps to increase the wellbeing of its members.
There are powerful historical and institutional factors that impact on their behaviour,
thus making it difficult to precisely predict their position on economic reform. This
complexity is multiplied when the researcher tries to understand the position and
behaviour of the union within the context of an alliance relationship as is the case in
Spain, Poland, Argentina, and of course South Africa. The guiding assumption is that
there is nothing obvious in the position that these trade union federations took and are
continuing to take on privatisation. Their policy positions and actions on privatisation
must be conceptualised and clarified, and in answering the first question, one wants to
know if this framework enables enough leverage to understand the current positions.
The five variables are specified in the following way to enable us to empirically verify
its usefulness:
Social linkages can only be specified in a qualitative manner. The present author is
dependent here on both the perceptions of ANC and COSATU members, as well as
their respective position documents on the alliance relationship.
Party Strength is measured by the election results obtained for the political party. The
official election results published by the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA)
will be used.
Union Competition is measured by the existence of other trade union federations
comparable in size and membership.
Leadership Overlap is specified as the degree to which union members are effectively
integrated into policy decision-making structures. In spite of leadership overlap in
Argentina, unionists do not determine the policy direction of the PJ party. The present
author takes the view that absolute numbers do not provide us with a true reflection of
6 The term "union" refers to a trade union federation, which is the mother body of all the different
affiliates. This is the meaning of the term throughout unless otherwise indicated.
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the relative power of unionists m influencing policy decisions of the party or
government.
Balance of Dependence/Union Autonomy is specified as the degree to which the union
is dependent on government or its rank-and-file for its power and positions.
Quantitatively, one simply determines if unions are financially self-sufficient.
The purpose of this question is to test the overall explanatory power of the theoretical
model of Levitsky and Way (1998). It is for this reason that no formal propositions
are presented for the separate factors in the model.
Do the policy positions ofCOSATU find expression in the attitudes and opinions of
its leaders in South Africa?
This question essentially traces the official policy positions of COSATU on
privatisation to its manifestation in the empirical data. The empirical data on the
opinions of labour leaders are found in the South African National Leadership
Opinion Survey of 1997/98. Does a consideration of the formal resolutions adopted at
labour congresses enable the researcher to meaningfully interpret the data? The
emphasis would be on both similarities as much as differences between the congress
hall and survey research. The brief introduction of the problem suggested differences
within the union, but it has not revealed major caprice in the position of union leaders.
The implicit assumption is therefore that there are very few factors that would lead to
a mutation of a position from the congress hall to its expression in a survey.
Proposition 1: An essentially negative or positive policy position on privatisation
will translate into a similar negative or positive opinion and attitude in the South
African National Leadership Opinion Survey of 1997/98.
Are these opinions or attitudes of COSATU leaders significantly different from
ANC leaders?
The mere fact that we are considering the position and behaviour of unions in the
context of the alliance-relationship opens up the possibility of tension between the
two partners. There is enough evidence that has been introduced in the opening part of
the chapter to suggest differences. There is also evidence that COSATU is not united
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
17
1.5 KEY CONCEPTS
The framework of Levitsky and Way (1998) explains the fate or the outcome of the
relationship between party and union. The outcomes of the party-labour alliance in
Poland and Argentina are described as either "sustained co-operation" in Argentina
on the issue of privatisation. When COSATU at its CEC meeting in 1996 accepted
some form of partial privatisation, the larger unions claimed that they were the
architects in the shift in policy. Public sector unions were interpreted as more
recalcitrant to restructuring exercises (Gebhart, 1996). COSATU (1999) on the other
hand seems to argue that many leaders in the ruling party are not accountable enough
to their constituencies and the internal structures of the alliance. The latter allegation
broaches the notion that there might be resistance to the very policies of the ANC
within its own ranks. This particular question therefore attempts to establish the
empirical manifestation of differences between the .party and the union, and
differences within party and union on privatisation. Although there is evidence of
splits in both party and union, most of the battles have been fought between the
governing party and labour. This leads me to propose the following:
Proposition 2: Differences are more likely to manifest between party and union,
rather than differences within the respective organisations.
What is the future of privatisation as understood from the perspective of the
proposed framework?
This is the predictive part of the study. What is the future not only of the alliance
relationship, but more importantly, how will the unfolding alliance relationship
impact on actual privatisation programmes? Will privatisation be shelved, or is there
going to be an acceleration of the pace of these programmes? The important point to
register here is that the alliance relationship will determine the pace of progress on
privatisation. A positive relationship would be one where the alliance partners express
a steadfast willingness to find common ground on the contested issues.
Proposition 3: If there is a positive relationship between party and union, then
privatisation is going to be expedited. If the relationship is negative, ensuing
obstacles will slow down the pace of privatisation.
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and "early defection" in Poland. The South African scenario has not reached the stage
of defections, and this therefore requires the researcher to transpose the terms and
outcomes to effectively describe the dominant position that labour adopted on
privatisation. The present author is proposing the following two terms, namely
"sustained co-operation" and "opposition."
The key assumption is that unions are of the opinion that there are other approaches
available to deal with ownership or efficiency concerns in state owned enterprises.
This definition does not imply that unions are principally opposed to restructuring per
se, but the contestation is essentially about privatisation's claim to be the most
effective and efficient tool.
Sustained Co-operation
"This refers to the willingness of unions to engage government on privatisation issues
with the primary purpose of ameliorating the potentially negative consequences of
privatisation. "
The key assumption is that when unions indicated their willingness to negotiate with
government on restructuring and privatisation, they must have been aware that
retrenchments were a real possibility. Unions' behaviour is interpreted as distributing
the social costs of privatisation over a longer period, and to discuss alternative
employment possibilities with employer organisations for those workers to be
retrenched. This definition does not rule out the possibility of strategic criticism of
government's privatisation programme. Such criticism deals with procedure that
employer organisations need to follow in initiating restructuring programmes, or it
can be accusations that employer organisations are violating the letter and the spirit of
formal agreements.
Opposition
"Opposition to privatisation is defined as the principled rejection of privatisation as
the most efficient way to restructuring state owned enterprises. "
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For purposes of consistency, the proposed study will adopt the following concepts as
they are defined in the National Framework Agreement (NFA):
Privatisation
Privatisation refers to the policy of converting public ownership of an asset to the
private sector, or permitting the performance of a certain activity, hitherto carried out
by a state owned enterprise, by a private sector business (NFA, 1996).
Restructuring
Restructuring refers to substantial changes as they affect ownership and control,
accountability, function and location of state assets (NFA, 1996).
State Owned Enterprises
Also referred to as public enterprises or parastatals, which provide goods and services.
The state is the controlling or sole shareholder and acts as steward of these aspects on
behalf of all South Africans (NFA, 1996).
Commercialisation
Commercialisation refers to a state corporation, which operates on a cost recovery
basis in the market place (NFA, 1996).
1.6 Methodology
The inquiry will be structured into two main parts. The first part would be an attempt
to assess the usefulness of the proposed theoretical framework in explaining the past
and current policy positions and behaviour of COSATU. Particular attention will be
focused on the disagreement between the governing party and union on the macro-
economic policy, Gear. This analysis will scrutinise the official policy positions
adopted by COSATU and the kind of action it engaged in concerning privatisation.
The second part of the inquiry will deal with the South African National Leadership
Opinion Survey of 1997/98. This is a secondary data source that was carried out to test
a broad range of attitudes among opinion leaders in South Africa. A secondary data
source is by definition data that had not been collected by the present author. The
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primary purpose of the mentioned survey was therefore not merely aimed at assessing
the opinions of the elite on privatisation. The present analysis, however, is going to
focus specifically on the attitudes of both labour and party on privatisation. The data
analysis will try to establish whether the policy positions of labour are reflected in the
concerns that COSATU leaders are expected to express on Gear, unemployment,
privatisation and nationalisation.
The data analysis is also going to try and establish if there are significant differences
of opinion between party and union on privatisation. Finally, the analysis would focus
on differences within party or union, if any.
1.7 Chronological Order of the Chapters
Chapter 2
This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first section will briefly examine the
experience of privatisation in developing countries. Both general privatisation issues
and the specific labour-party dynamic will be reviewed. The second section of this
chapter will look at the history of privatisation in South Africa. Attention will be
given to the aims and the results of the then privatisation programme. The final
section is going to deal with privatisation in the post-1994 era. Detailed attention will
be given to the way COSATU responded formally and politically. The unfolding
debate between COSATU and the government will be discussed within the proposed
framework of Levitsky and Way (1998). Finally, an assessment of the usefulness of
the framework and its ability to elucidate the policy positions and behaviour of
COSATU will be made.
Chapter 3: Methodology and Data Presentation
The data analysis will focus on differences within both party and union, and of course
differences between party and union. This part of the inquiry is going to be a
quantitative analysis of the attitudes of party- and union leaders on privatisation as
expressed in the South African National Leadership Opinion Survey of 1997/98.
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Chapter 4: Discussion of Data
This chapter will provide a more detailed and in- depth analysis of the data presented
in chapter 3. The two questions on whether the official positions of the unions are
reflected in the opinions of its leaders and the difference between the ANC and
COSATU will be tackled. This chapter will also attempt, on the basis of the
assessment of the theoretical framework and the data analysis, to speculate on the
direction of the future of privatisation in South Africa. Attention will also be paid to
the main outcomes of labour's position on privatisation i.e. are we going to see more
"co-operation" or "opposition"?
Chapter 5: Conclusion
This chapter will summarise the main findings and engage with the most recent
developments regarding privatisation. Attention will also be paid to questions for
future research on COSATU and privatisation.
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CHAPTER 2: PRIVATISATION AS A POLICY
2.1 The Experience of Privatisation in Developing Countries
The impetus behind neo-liberal economic reform in the United Kingdom and the
United States of America has been to redefine the scope of the state, to dislodge it
from the preponderant positions, and to confine it to clearly circumscribed limits
(Spulber, 1997: 101). (See also Esser, 1988; Ward, 1993; Foster, 1993).
Spulber (1997: 101) argues that a very similar approach has been advocated for the
developing economies of the world, although the latter faced unique problems. The
disintegration of the Soviet Union, where a number of difficult policy decisions had to
be made, represents a good example of the dilemmas in the developing world. The
Soviet Union had to choose between a "shock-therapy" that meant rapid price
liberalisation and privatisation and a "gradualist" process of preliminary legislative
and restructuring measures (Spulber, 1997: 105). The difficulty of accepting the shock
therapy is that many of the states in transition are not strong enough to deal with the
instability that unemployment brings.
It eventually chose the route of mass privatisation, which basically meant the
availability of vouchers that could be traded for shares. One of the results of this
privatisation process had been the establishment of what is known as nomenklatura
capitalism (Spulber, 1997: 120). This is simply the fiefdom that was left behind with
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and with the advent of privatisation
programmes, they were fortunate enough to have the wherewithal to purchase these
vouchers.Ï With the newly formed Russian government unable to assert true control
from the centre, many regions ran their own programmes with the result that the pace
of privatisation varied considerably. In most of the privatised industries, management
and workers made deals to keep outside investors out of the enterprises, and so
7 A good exposition of the problems that have been encountered in Russia with privatisation can be
found in Fortescue, S. (1994) "Privatisation of Russian Industry" Australian Journal of Political
Science 29: l35-154
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instead of initiating popular capitalism, the old guard took control again. The rapid
transformation of the Russian economy brought with it a number of negative
economic and social trends. In 1995, the Russian gross domestic product was only
50% of what it was in 1989 when the economic reforms began (Spulber, 1997: 174).
Poverty levels steeply increased and this led to social tensions that hindered the pace
and the extent of reforms. Currently, the projections are massive long-term
unemployment, and the author argues that the transition needs to focus on labour-
intensive projects to stimulate employment. Spulber (1997: 187) concludes by saying
that for many countries in Eastern Europe, privatisation is no longer the final solution,
because the new regimes are not able to cope with the economic uncertainties of
economic reform. A political process that aimed at undoing the foundations of the
erstwhile communist system drove the privatisation process in the Republics of
Czechoslovakia and Slovakia (Shafik, 1995: 1143).
The purpose of the privatisation exercise was merely to affect massive transferrals of
state property to private individuals. This meant that little or no restructuring of the
state owned enterprises was undertaken. There were no attempts by the two
governments to restructure the enterprises financially or to shed labour prior to it
being sold (Shafik, 1995: 1144). Many of the high priced privatised firms in the
Republic of Czechoslovakia had relatively small, but very productive labour forces.
There were thus fewer problems with redeployment in the event of restructuring
exercises. Shafik (1995: 1155) notes towards the end of the book that in spite of their
governments' intentions to popularise privatisation, most of the shares ended up in the
hands of institutional investors.
This experience has been found in many other countries, and the author asserts that
"mass privatisation" is merely a political ploy by governments to get the consent of
the people. Pinheiro and Schneider (1995: 752) argue that fiscal crises are one of the
most important reasons why governments in the developing world are intent on
privatising. The argument is that privatisation is seen as part of the fiscal solution,
because it frees up resources that have been devoted to the monitoring and controlling
of state owned enterprises. They argue that in developing countries, fiscal crises
accompanied privatisation, but post-hoc analyses have shown little direct fiscal
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contribution. The Chilean government started its privatisation programme as early as
1973, and after the completion of two phases, they reduced state owned enterprises
from a total of 596 to 48 state enterprises. The purpose of privatisation was to cut
personnel, de-emphasise a non-commercial focus, and to expose state enterprises to
the same market rigours as private companies. The initial phases were very successful
and the state owned enterprises contributed handsomely to the surplus on the gross
domestic product and transferred taxes and dividends equal to 7.8% ofGDP.
With the economic crisis of the 1980s, many of the privatised conglomerates in Chile
were re-nationalised. The advent of the third and fourth phases of privatisation made
revenue generation from privatisation proceeds less important. The goals were now
that of diversifying ownership, developing capital markets and reducing the public
debt (Pinheiro and Schneider, 1995: 757). The important point that Pinheiro and
Schneider (1995) make is that revenues from privatisation became significant only
after 1986 when expenditure had already declined. Pinheiro and Schneider (1995) say
that in comparison, privatisation in Brazil in the 1980s was very slow. This was due to
the restructuring of state owned enterprises' debt to the government, curbing
investments and current expenditure, and the imports of the enterprises.
President Collor had during 1989 expanded the privatisation programme to traditional
state owned enterprises, and the authors say this effort is likely to be extended to
public utilities, transportation and communications. The fiscal adjustment that the
Brazilian government had to make came mostly in the form of contracting
investments to the state enterprises. Investment to the state owned enterprises declined
from 4.9% of GDP in 1980/82 to 1.9% in 1989/91. The Brazilian government mostly
used the proceeds from privatisation to reduce the public deficit. Privatisation,
according to the authors had little impact on fiscal balance and macro-economic
stability. Closer to Southern Africa is the experience of Ghana, which in the eyes of
many commentators represent the quintessential example of successful
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economic adjustment in Africa. Lall (1995: 2024) indicates that in the World Bank's
assessment, Ghana is considered to be the most advanced country in Africa in terms
of removing trade barriers. Privatisation of the state owned enterprises ranks as one of
the country's finest achievements. Many of the state owned enterprises operated in the
manufacturing sector, and it is in this sector that the World Bank made part of its
assessment. Lall (1995) says that the World Bank recorded growth of 4.5% for the
period 1987-1991. The decision to open the local markets to international competition
meant declining levels of output and growth in the manufacturing sector from a high
of 5.1% to 1.1% in 1992. The state owned enterprises that were operating in the
manufacturing sector did not have the technical ability to compete with mostly first
world countries.
One of the problems that Lall (1995) identifies is the inability of the manufacturing
sector to diversify, and to use the advantages of cheaper labour in Ghana. Added to
the woes of the industry was the fact that the manufacturing sector has not developed
additional technical abilities to compete effectively. There were absolutely no policies
to upgrade skills, nor any mention of technical information and support to boost the
ailing production. The important point to take away here is that if privatisation does
not consider the issue of technical transfer, then you have literally a transfer of
poverty, and not genuine property. Lall (1995) cautions in the end that structural
adjustment programmes must be pursued more gradually and with greater control,
strategy and involvement by government.
Di Tella (1992: 28) makes the point that in Chile and Brazil, there was always a
champion of the neo-liberal economic reforms, but that this was prevented in
Argentina as a result of the Peronist political tradition. It took the government of
president Menen and the technical artifice of Covallo to tum Argentina to these
policies they once rejected. The author says that privatisation is proceeding fast and
that there is no real political force that genuinely opposes it. Both the radicals and the
Peronist trade unions are said to be in two minds about the process, and with the
resounding electoral successes, it appears as if resistance to privatisation has
completely disappeared. Di Tella (1992: 29) says that those unions that were
fundamentally opposed to privatisation failed to garner the protest vote partly out of
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Workers have apparently succeeded in highlighting the blight of unemployment
whom workers feel had been neglected in the privatisation exercises (Kloc, 1992:
148). The unions in Poland are currently entangled in two models of behaviour for
unions, the so-called grievance and the participatory model (Marciniak, 1992: 150).
The former model simply refers to the confrontational demand to redress grievances,
disunity and to the hesitancy of discontented Peronistas to break away. One of the
reasons why the trade unionists do not want to break away is of course for reasons of
material and political benefit (Levitsky and Way, 1998). The privatisation process in
Poland represents perhaps the most fascinating account of the evolving battles
between government and labour. Kloc (1992: 139) said that at the end of 1989, most
people in Poland were willing to swallow the bitter pill of economic reform. The turn
came in the period 1990/92 when the social attitudes of most Polish people began to
change dramatically.
Strike activity in this period was the most visible manifestation of this discontent, and
it occurred in the state railways, mining and the local inter-city transit system. These
workers were all in a privileged position, and so when the reforms began to make a
serious impact, they protested heavily. The focus of the strikes was the austerity
programmes that the government implemented in the state owned enterprises (Kloc,
1992: 141). The government's main intentions in the state enterprises were to lower
production costs, alter the production profile and cut the personnel. Restructuring of
the state owned enterprises was supposed to take place at the plant level, but
management and workers pulled together against the government.
Management was hesitant to carry through the massive lay-off, and this in large
guaranteed the peace between management and the workers. The first strikes in the
privati sed plants took place in 1991 and so demolished the myth that privatisation
would cure all the firms' problems and make the wages of workers rise (Kloc, 1992:
144). Strikes were continually directed at those firms that were in the process of
restructuring and involving massive job losses. The author notes that the most
important battles were fought about the allocation of costs of economic restructuring
and the distribution of resources left from the old regime.
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while the participatory model sees the urnons as dialoguing with government on
privatisation. The author criticises the participatory model because the unions were
refused the opportunity to help in the determination of the pace and direction of
economic reform. Marciniak (1992: 155) does not necessarily argue against
privatisation, but he accuses the unions of lacking specific positions on this contested
issue. The author indicates that there is a huge amount of state property that still has
to be distributed, and the future of privatisation depends on how this property
distribution takes place. He argues that the result of privatisation can either be the
empowerment of a few individuals, or it can lead to a society dominated by the
middle class.
The fact that the main unions have not even thought about how a legal framework
should be developed to benefit ordinary people, is a vivid reminder of the current
double bind of so many unions in Poland. It appears from this short review of the
experiences of developing countries that there were a number of unanticipated
consequences of privatisation. The scourge of unemployment and the attendant social
tensions that accompany this loom very large for prospective privatisers. Dhanji and
Milanovic (1991: 47) argue that many of these countries, especially those in the
former communist block lacked a legal framework in which privatisation could take
place. In most of these instances, constitutions had to be amended to allow for private
property, commercial laws had to be updated, and competition legislation had to be
introduced.
There were also questions about the ability of undeveloped local capital markets to
absorb the new trading in shares. In terms of the South African situation, many of
these concerns are not present as a result of our good banking and financial
infrastructure. There is however a lack of formal legislation, and the Minister of
Public Enterprise's recent statements point to the introduction of laws to guide the
privatisation experience in South Africa (Chalmers, 1999). In order to develop a
proper perspective on the current privatisation situation in South Africa, it is
necessary to revisit the short history of privatisation prior to 1994.
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2.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Privatisation's introduction in the South African context called up the same arguments
that were used in the international context, namely a reduction in the scope of the
state's involvement in the economy.
The centrepiece of policy in the old dispensation was the White Paper on
Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa, 1987. The White
Paper offered a classic analysis of the over-burdening role of the state, and its
tendencies to dominate economic life at the expense of the private sector. The
statistics tell a story of its own; in 1985 the public sector's contribution to the GDP
was 38.1% of which the central government's consumption expenditure contributed
26% of that figure (White Paper, 1987: 4). Government was also responsible for using
most of the net savings of the country. In terms of all net investments, 63.7% had
been channelled to the public sector and only 36.3% to the private sector in the period
1970 to 1984.
The White Paper argues that the then fast growing population of South Africa put
enormous strain on the public sector and causing it to expand (White Paper, 1987: 1).
The key problem was that the public sectors were managed as political units and not
commercially where the main criterion is of course return on the capital invested. The
economic considerations were that a sizeable state sector has never been exposed to
the discipline and rigours of the market and price mechanism. This then became the
basis for the definition of privatisation in the White Paper:
"Privatisation means the systematic transfer of appropriate functions, activities or
property from the public to the private sector, where services, production and
consumption can be regulated more efficiently by the market and the price
mechanism" (White Paper, 1987: 8).
It is difficult to assess what the government intended in general to exclude from the
possible list of privati sed state enterprises. The only indication was that certain
functions, which were closely related to the public interests and that, required
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Other aims that are mentioned are the provision of infrastructure, economic support to
large-scale private capital, and jobs for working class Afrikaners. Fine (1997: 23)
argues that in the middle 80s, there was a shift to privatisation policies to provide in
the regime's short-term funding as a result of the international debt freeze of the 80s.
The privatisation was also seen as removing ownership and control of significant state
assets from a future democratic government. There were various reactions to the
White Paper and most of the contributions focused on the proceeds of the proposed
privatisation process. Gouws (1989: 13) argued strongly against the use of the
privatisation proceeds for future public sector projects. His arguments were that if
compulsory performance by state officials could not be privati sed (White Paper, 1987:
11). We do know that five state owned enterprises were earmarked for privatisation,
namely the South African Transport Services (SATS), Iron and Steel Corporation
(ISCOR), Electrical Supply Commission (ESKOM), FOSKOR and the Post and
Telecommunication Service (Saayman, 1989: 24). It is not clear if certain functions
like water provision and health were included in the potential list of privatised
functions. This lack of clarity is not necessarily dispelled by the following proviso:
"[Privatisation of a function or activity must] not defeat the constitutional, social or
ecological objectives served by afunction or activity ... " (White Paper, 1987: 11).
The interesting aspect of the policy on privatisation was that the government, unlike
many of its counterparts in the developing world, conceived of the importance of
restructuring before a sale is undertaken. Another unique feature of the White Paper
was that the government confronted retrenchment fears, and it appears as if it wanted
at all costs to avoid retrenchment as a result of privatisation. The White Paper repeats
the point that retrenchment of government personnel must be kept to a minimum. This
turned out to be a politically expedient ploy, as the present author will show when we
will review some of the results of the privatisation programme. This ties in with the
views of Fine (1997: 23) who says that the huge state corporations have been built up
as a strategic element in securing the apartheid regime against the threat of
international sanctions.
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privatisation was meant to reduce the role of the state, then private sector savings
should not be used to finance the continuing dominance if the state sector. The state at
that time had been pressured to invest in infrastructure in the black communities, and
the author was of the opinion that the private sector had to be involved. This would
have been a way for the private sector to increase its share of profitable fixed
investments. The gist of Gouws' argument was that the proceeds from privatisation
should go into the redemption of government debt. Gouws (1989) does not seem to
have any concerns about unemployment and the equitable distribution of social
services that other economists grappled with. It is interesting to note in this regard that
SATS and ESKOM were very reluctant, circa middle eighties, to get involved in the
delivery of non-commercial services (Wallis and Truu, 1990: 248).8
One of the main reasons for the reluctance was that both public utilities were deficit-
ridden, and tried to take decisions on a purely commercial basis. This looks
suspiciously like the roots of the corparitist approach championed by TRANSNET
today. Saayman (1989: 26) argued that feasibility studies were necessary to determine
the impact of privatisation on competition, the public interests and social welfare. The
author also raised the question of health services and argued that it constitutes a grey
area, as there were so many people who could not afford basic healthcare (Saayman,
1989: 30). Brand (1988: 245) believed that the proceeds must be spent on the
redemption of public debt, the creation of capital funds for small businesses and
investment in infrastructure in the black community.
According to Brand (1988: 245) the privatisation programme had to be assessed on its
ability to increase the efficiency of the economy, and whether it succeeded in
achieving its distribution goals. Davis (1991: 170) argues that the shortcomings of the
public provision of electricity were linked to the market structure and lack of
competition. According to the author there would have been few reasons for ESKOM
8 Incidentally, SATS converted into a company, named Transnet in 1989/90 with five separate
divisions, namely railways, road transport, ports, pipelines and airways.
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Employment in the private sector declined by 11.7% in the period 1989 to 1994 at an
average of 2.5% annually (South African Reserve Bank, 1996). The stated intention
of the privatisation policy was to move factors of production to the more productive
private sector to encourage allocative efficiency. One of the consequences was a
major public investment slowdown, and it is argued that the falling parastatal
investment contributed to the severe recession of 1989 to 1993 (Makgetla, 1995: 69).
Parastatal employment plummeted over the same period. Transnet, Telkom, the Post
to remain in public hands, but there are also few reasons to alter its ownership. In a
similar fashion, questions are raised about equity and access in the wake of
privatisation (Cloete, 1986: 91). Most economic analyses of privatisation regard the
retrenchment of workers as a necessary evil, and yet, nowhere in the analysis of the
economists discussed above, are there an endorsement of this view. They both
endorse the view that the state should take all steps to ensure that members of staff are
accommodated somehow. Truu (1988: 265) focused on the importance of developing
competitive markets in the aftermath of privatisation. The author remarks that private
sector spokesmen always welcome free markets, but they rarely call for competitive
markets. The author had foreseen that a successful privatisation programme would
increase the number of new corporate taxpayers and contain state expenditure via
reduced subsidies.
Much of the predictions that these economists had made turn out to be far from the
consequent economic realities. Five years after the privatisation programme, many of
the key targets of the privatisation policy had not been realised. Reducing the
involvement of the public sector in the national economy essentially entailed cutting
government's consumption expenditure. In 1993, government's consumption
expenditure was still relatively higher than that of the private sector. Current
expenditure to GDP grew from 17.4% in 1980 to 28.9% in 1993/4 (South African
Reserve Bank, 1996). This figure is made worse by the fact that while current
expenditure was steadily increasing, capital expenditure declined constantly in the
same period. Brand (1988: 256) complained that the imbalance between domestic
savings and investments on the one hand, and the declining ability of the economy to
create jobs on the other hand were major reasons for the privatisation policy.
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Office and Eskom accounted for 20% of the job losses, yet collectively they
represented only 5% of national employment. Van Driel (1998: 33) says that the
restructuring drive between 1985 and 1996 meant that up to 60% of labour in the
traditional state owned enterprises had been shed. The promise that the then
government made to retain as many jobs as possible has simply not held. The present
author interprets this promise of the old government as an attempt to pacify its
constituency in the state enterprises.
It is therefore not surprising that the current ANC government has to deal with the
same dilemma, because many of the public sector unions are in the tripartite alliance.9
There are speculations now that the government had plans to restructure Spoornet
before the 1999 election, but only revealed this after the election out of fear for the
political repercussions (Business Day, 09 July 1999). The next section will therefore
deal with the current privatisation after the announcement in October 1995 that the
government intends to privatise some ofthe state owned enterprises.
2.3 PRIVATISATION IN THE POST-1994 PERIOD
The purpose of this section is to explore the most important dynamics that played
itself out after the 1994 elections, and to put the proposed theoretical framework to
the test. Specific attention will be paid to the problems of restructuring, and the
evolving tussle between the government and the labour federations on the direction of
the restructuring programme.
9 Public service unions constitute 37% of total membership in COSATU. This is followed by the
manufacturing sector 27.9% and mining 15.3% (Grawitsky, 1999). The main public sector affiliates in
COSATU are the National Education Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHA WU), 231 825; South
African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), 210 509; the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union
(POPCRU), 59 145, and the South African Public Service Association Workers Union (SAPSA WWV),
14318 (COSATU, 1999).
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2.3.1 UNFOLDING DYNAMICS IN THE POST-1994 PERIOD
Government announced a six- point plan to transform the public sector on 29 October
1995 (Makgetla, 1995: 65). One of the points raised in the announcement concerned
the restructuring and the privatisation of government assets. The purpose of this
exercise was to raise much needed revenue and to further the aims of black economic
empowerment. Since the announcement, a range of problems has been experienced in
the restructuring and privatisation of state enterprises, and it is to these issues that we
tum our attention to now. Dexter (1994: 33) argues that the labour preferential policy
created structural problems in terms of the management of state enterprises. This
meant that managers were chosen not so much for their managerial acumen, but for
their loyalties to the apartheid regime.
The result was reduced efficiency and an unresponsive staff who only answered to
their political superiors. The author argues that is erroneous of political commentators
to suggest that the remedy for this problem is a reduction in the size and the scope of
the state enterprises. He argues that the future public service needs to be larger than
the enterprises maintained in the apartheid regime. Dexter (1994) therefore foresees a
concomitant drop in the size of central government relative to government in the
provinces. 10
The Public Enterprise Ministry encountered a number of obstacles on its way to
privatise. Sigcau, the past Minister of Public Enterprise had on numerous occasions
asked the major role players to move beyond the sterile opposition of state against the
market. The then Minister linked privatisation explicitly with productivity and
increased efficiency, but she was unable to unlock the competing interests in the
government of national unity (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 24 November 1995).
Members of the ANC and the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) were apparently opposed
10 Roberts (1999) believes that the private sector can deliver a public service like water more
effectively and far cheaper than the state. There is one point in the article where the author almost
sounds a celebratory note regarding the public sector job losses. Dikgang Moseneke, although then, not
yet a convert of privatisation, noted that Telkom would not hold a monopoly forever, and the
implication of restructuring and privatisation is faintly present here (Callaghan, 1995).
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to the idea of black economic empowerment. She had to contend with the divided
government on the one hand, and the claims of unions on the other hand that
privatisation is going to mean job losses (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 24 November
1995). Dexter (1996: 8) says that although the National Framework Agreement has
laid down principles, there has been little progress in re-defining the strategic
orientation and direction of the state enterprises. He argues that inasmuch as the right
of the public sector is upheld in the NFA, many officials in government are of the
opinion that the public sector is not the best place to deliver important services. The
ability of the private sector to deliver the much-needed goods is questioned as he
points out that there is also evidence of mismanagement in the private sector. Dexter
(1996: 11) seems to be of the opinion that state enterprises need to be subj ected to the
pressures of the product and capital market without necessarily privatising.
In questioning the inherently superior status of the private sector over the public
sector, Dexter (1996) would be supported by a body of research that argues that there
is little evidence to prove this (Kay and Thompson, 1986: 22; Domberger and Piggot,
1986: 150). Adelzadeh (1997) argues that state owned enterprises are not performing
well because of poor investment decisions, inappropriate pricing policies, managerial
impediments, political interference, and the incompatibility of civil service with
commercial operations. One of the inhibiting problems in this field is the dire lack of
capital, and it is a known fact that after GEAR, many state enterprises would have to
find alternative ways of raising capital.
Adelzadeh (1997) recommends that privatisation should not necessarily be seen as the
only way to improve the position of the state enterprises, that participation of trade
unions should be encouraged and that a cautious sectoral approach to privatisation be
followed. Wackernagel (1997) says that the problems of the government's
privatisation programme do not so much relate to the pace of the programme, but
more so to the thinking that guides it. The author argues that business has complained
about the impediment unions present as enshrined in the NFA. The business
environment could not predict if government is interested in strategic alliances, the
retention of a golden share or if the whole operations are going to be sold off? The
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author argues that the feeling amongst business people was that Sigcau did not have
the strategic answers to these questions. Chalmers and Grawitzky (1999) argue that
there are perceptions that government privatisation programme is moving too slowly,
and that the programme is mismanaged and hampered by labour. Government also
seems to evince an inability to explain the complexity of the process and the myriad
of obstacles that it faces. The authors question the notion that labour was thus far that
most important impediment, and point out that at local government, unions have
eagerly participated in privatisation. The problems they identify are lack of clarity on
the details of the programme, mismanagement of Aventura and the Alexcor deals, and
the lengthy delays in the eventual privatisation of the concerned state enterprise.
Implicit in this statement is the repetition of the fact that business is incapable of
reading government's commitment to privatisation. The example of mismanagement
is the sale of Aventura where the successful bidder, Kopane ke Matla, the investment
wing of COSATU has not come up with the money. This has resulted in mounting job
losses, a demoralised staff and top managers resigning (Chalmers and Grawitzky,
1999). Another recent example of restructuring is the case of Spoornet where
transformations plans have already been presented to the mother company Transnet to
tum around the rail company's financial misfortunes (Chalmers, 1999). The main
problem seems to be Spoornet's continuing operations on many unprofitable lines
where major losses in the freight volumes were recorded. The managing director Saki
Macozoma said that 40% of the network is not viable, and that restructuring of
Spoornet will have major implications for labour.
This short review of the problems of privatisation has indicated some of the important
role players. We will now examine some of their concerns as well as the way in which
government responded. Already in 1994, prior to the announcement of state asset
restructuring, pressure was put on the Minister of Public Enterprise by business and
economists to privatise to raise funds for the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (Gqubule, 1994). Commercialisation of the state enterprises and the
empowerment of black entrepreneurs were then high on the priority list of
government. Kenneth Clarcke, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the
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selling off state assets would solve the problem of under-investment and output
expansion in the public sector (Wackernagel, 1996). The argument that was put
forward was that South Africa does not have the tax base to finance huge capital
outlays, and that international investment would fill this gap. The United States
Under-secretary, Eizenstat also criticised government for the slow pace on
privatisation (Wadula, 1999). His main argument was that the silverware of the state
enterprises would be better managed when in the hands of the private sector.
Privatisation, according to this top United States official would provide the treasury
with tremendous foreign capital, and for these funds to be used in education,
infrastructure and health care. The recently held World Economic Forum in Durban
said that urgent policy changes ought to be made in areas such as privatisation and the
regulation of the labour market (Smith, 1999).
Some of the new plans are the privatisation of the state forestry Safcol, and smaller
assets such as Abakor, the state abattoir operations and some of the national park
interests. The Minister of Public Enterprises said that the first five years of the
ministry laid the foundation for the speeding up of the privatisation process. He
indicated that the government needs to increase capacity and improving skills on the
Public Enterprise department (Kobokoane, 1999). Part of this new programme is the
designing of a new legislative blueprint for the privatisation programme that would
outline the rules for both local and international players. Radebe said that the top
priority is to accelerate the pace of the programme by creating a legal framework that
would erase doubts about government's commitment to privatisation (Chalmers,
1999).
Government was roundly criticised for approaching privatisation on a case-by-case
basis, and it called on government to fundamentally commit itself to privatisation.
Government's response came by way of President Thabo Mbeki who indicated early
this year that government is going to establish an international investment council,
speed up privatisation and review some of the labour laws (Paton, 1999). The
Minister of Public Enterprise Jeff Radebe also responded by announcing a range of
measures that government intend to implement. The Ministry plans to sell R170
billion in state assets by 2004 (Block and Soggot, 1999).
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The new framework will be applicable to all enterprises owned by the state. The aim
of the restructuring programme has as its main objective the transformation of the
state enterprises from cost centres into commercial businesses. Particular attention is
going to be given to Denel to enhance its role in the military procurement package. In
outlining the new privatisation programme, the minister cautioned that full-scale
restructuring would involve major job losses, and that there are going to be negative
social and economic consequences. It is indeed the fear of retrenchment that drove
unions to question the logic of the restructuring and privatisation drive of the
government. The NFA was signed on 7 February 1996 as an agreement between
government, COSATU, National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) and the
Federation of South African Labour Unions (FEDSAL).
The agreement was made in the wake of the protest of organised labour and what it
saw as the job-shedding implications of restructuring. The NFA determines that
labour should participate in policy formulation, and that every effort should be made
to prevent job losses (NFA, 1996). It also states that where job losses are inevitable,
the affected state enterprise should put forward a social plan to cushion the shock of
retrenchment. Other measures include the re-deployment of workers between the
different state enterprises and the restructuring of the pension and the provident funds.
The NFA is reminiscent of the White Paper on Privatisation in 1987 in that both
involve sensitive dealing with important labour constituencies.
The NFA evoked various responses from the different role players and it is instructive
to review some of the reactions. Sections of labour called on the unions that are bound
by the agreement to withdraw from the NFA, because the latter binds the unions to
privatisation (Ray, 1997: 15). This call came in particular from the South African
Municipal Workers' Union, which by virtue of the fact that it is a local union, is not
bound by the NFA. COSATU (1999) on the other hand has called for a renewal of the
NFA to enable the federation to re-negotiate a fresh new set of principles on
restructuring with government. The political parties, and chiefly the Democratic Party
has called on government to ditch the NFA, because unions are using it to hamper
privatisation (Ensor, 1999). Labour analysts and unionists say that between the period
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1985-1996, 60% of labour in some state enterprises had been shed (van Driel, 1998:
33). In addition the Democratic Party leader, Tony Leon and Jeremy Cronin of the
South African Communist Party estimate that the last five years saw between 300 000
and 500 000 jobs lost in the South African economy. It is estimated that 370 000 of
the jobs lost, were in the public sector (Roberts, 1999). The South African Airways
(SAA) has shed 1064 jobs since 1998 in the company's build-up to partial
privatisation (Chalmers, 1999). Before the restructuring process, SAA employed 11
000 people and a study that was commissioned by Andrew Coleman suggests that
3000 people need to be retrenched. Spoornet's financial woes have forced it to
retrench redundant workers in the rail parastatal. Spoornet's falling freight volumes
and the stagnant nature of the South African economy have pushed the losses of the
enterprise to between RIOD and R500 million.
Speculations were abounding early in this year that job losses in the restructuring
exercise at Spoornet could be as many as 18000 jobs (Weekly Mail and Guardian, 08
July 1999; Chalmers, 1999). Organised labour criticised Spoornet plans to retain only
the profitable lines, and giving independent operators access to loss-making or
marginal lines (Grawitzky, 1999). Labour has proposed that Spoornet package both
the productive and the unproductive lines and opening it up to competitive bidding
processes. Labour argues that Spoornet did not allow for the inflow of external capital
or provide for competitive bidding processes.
Similarly, TELKOM plans to streamline its operations through a programme of
retrenchment, outsourcing and cost containment (Grawitzky, 1999). By May 1999,
2500 applications for voluntary early retrenchment have been received of which
2 100 have been approved thus far. It is estimated that TELKOM plans to shed 11 000
jobs (Lambert, 1999). Most recently, TELKOM has identified 5 700 employees who
will face forced retrenchment and a further 2600 jobs could be outsourced. In order to
bring the total retrenchment figure to 11 000, TELKOM estimated that it could lose
200 employees a month (Grawitzky, 1999). The labour federation COSATU indicated
that the recent wave of retrenchments is the most devastating in the history of South
Africa with more than 50 000 jobs in question. It promised mass action to protest the
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Harvey (1999) states that the research of the National Institute for Economic Policy
(NIEP) has shown that GEAR has failed in every major respect and that a different
macro-economic framework is needed now. Harvey (1999) argues again in a different
article that the current disputes between the government and the unions on the public
wage issue and Transnet can be traced to GEAR. In both of these cases, a
fundamental shake-up of the public sector based on the prescriptions of GEAR is
followed. Cronin (1997) argues that GEAR is ambiguous: on the one hand there is the
NFA, which commits itself to the prioritisation of service delivery and job creation,
and an enthusiasm for privatisation on the other hand. GEAR has from its
recent state of affairs and to raise the profile of the situation, because many of its
affiliates indicated that some retrenchments are done quietly. Adelzadeh (1996)
questions the almost exclusive reliance of GEAR on the private sector for investment,
which in reality means the state's withdrawal from certain productive sectors of the
economy. This reduction in the scope and size of the state lies at the heart of the
debate between the alliance partners as they continue to squabble about restructuring
and privatisation. Parastatals have begun to be dominated by commercial values and
the hopes for subsidies to be increased to facilitate the access of the poor to utilities
have been dashed (Bond, 1996: 27). The author argues that the opposition to GEAR
did not so much come from SACP as such, but more from factions within the SACP
and the Workers' Organisation for Socialist Action (WOSA) (Bond, 19996: 30).
There are many who believe that GEAR has not been efficiently implemented because
it remains a contested policy inside and outside government (Grawitzky, 1999).
Nkadimeng, a lecturer in the Sociology department at WITS University argues that
prior to 1994, the ANC consulted its partners in civil society. After the election, both
local, international business and international finance institutions have pressured the
ANC to accept an essentially neo-liberal economic framework. Harvey (1999) argues
that people should not expect so much from the ANC, because it was never a pure
socialist party. Harvey (1999) argues that after the adoption of GEAR, the ANC had
to balance the interests of the constraining market-driven GEAR and the huge social
deficits inherited from the apartheid era.
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inception promised a 1.3-% growth in employment, but the realities showed that there
was a 1.3-% decline in the jobs available. To date the following privatisation
transactions have taken place: a sale of a 20% stake in SAA to Swissair, 30% stake in
TELKOM to a Malaysian and an American company, and a 30% stake in the Airports
company. In addition, nine radio stations have been sold, and 100 per cent of Sun Air
was sold as well (Chalmers, 1999). The Post Office has secured a 10% management
partnership with New Zealand Post International, and a further 10% ofTELKOM is in
the offing. Aventura has found a new management partner in Protea Hotels after the
botched COSATU deal. The sale of South Africa's commercial forests is in an
advanced stage, and the two concerns that are enjoying the attention now are of
course Spoornet and Denel.
It would appear that the most important dynamics of restructuring and privatisation
revolved around fears of retrenchment, the pace and direction of the privatisation
programme and most importantly, on government's GEAR policy. Government has
begun to position itself to deliver the first fully-fledged legal framework for
privatisation, and yet at the same time, they are flirting with the possibility of an NFA
II. This last statement neatly captures the strategic position that government took up in
its dealings with organised labour. The existence of the NFA did not prevent it from
pushing ahead with the privatisation programme.
All of these debates had an effect on the alliance between the ANC and COSATU,
and this in tum shaped the response of the labour federation on restructuring and
privatisation. We now need to consider the position of COSATU on privatisation, and
whether the theoretical framework of Levitsky and Way (1998) enables us to
understand the positions that the federation assumed.
2.3.2 TESTING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The framework will be tested and debated under five headings, which are incidentally
the five variables in the framework. The theoretical framework has already been
expounded in the introductory chapter, and we shall only capture the proposition
associated with each of the variables.
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Social Linkages
The initial support that labour in Poland, Argentina and Spain gave to neo-liberal
economic reforms is explained on the basis of social linkages, shared identities and
networks of close personal ties (Levitsky and Way, 1998: 172). One would have to
assume that these social linkages are sustained because the partners share not only
ideas, but also physical and social space. These authors are of the opinion that a
similar situation between the ANC and COSATU is present in South Africa. They
argue that this is one of the factors that reinforce the alliance, and therefore implicitly
moderate the behaviour of the trade union on the reform programme of the ruling
party. What is the situation in South Africa?
COSATU reflects on the relationship in the following way:
"Despite not being formally part of the Congress movement at its birth in 1985,
COSATU developed a close association with the Congress movement from its
inception. Conditions in the country dictated the need to go beyond bread and butter
issues to embrace the national and class struggle. This perspective was formally
endorsed with COSATU's adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1987" (COSATU,
1996).
The decision to become part of the tripartite alliance was decided at the federation's
4th national congress in 1991. COSATU entered into this alliance with the knowledge
that the alliance consists of independent organisations with independent structures
for mandating and decision making. This relationship is given more content in the
following statement:
"The essence of the relationship is trust and the sharing of a common vision and
objectives." (COSATU, 1999).
The descriptions above contain some of the essential elements for a basic
understanding of the position of COSATU during, and after the struggle. Both the
ANC and COSATU represented sections of the South African community that were
denied basic human rights. COSA TU's insertion into the political arena was almost
inevitable, and so, also the need to seek out ideologically similar partners. It found
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these likeminded partners in the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the ANC in
exile. There is no evidence whatsoever that this common predicament led to the
fusion of the two organisations, neither is the evidence compelling enough to suggest
that COSATU was a "front" for the ANC. No better was this illustrated in the
relations of party and union after 1994. The ANC on its part conceives of the
relationship in the following way:
It is difficult to argue with the above statement, but it almost obscures the fact that
COSATU was formed seven decades after the establishment of the ANC. The "deep
historical links" that September refers to have developed in six years from
COSATU's formation in 1985 to the ANC's unbanning in 1990. Finally, Patrick
Lekota, the national chairperson of the ANC made more or less the same statement
when he referred to the tensions between the ANC and its alliance partners (ANC
National Conference, 1997). In terms of the original framework, the existence of these
social linkages will facilitate and reinforce the alliance relationship.
"The tripartite alliance is therefore not a matter of sentiment, but an organisational
expression of the common purpose and unity in action that these forces share, and
continue jointly to define and re-define in the course of undertaking the tasks of the
NDR." (ANCNational Conference, 1997). [My emphasis]
On the surface, all these declarations seem to reinforce the idea of social linkages, but
we should not forget that the formal "alliance" only started after the ANC and the
SACP were unbanned in 1990. It therefore does not even begin to approach the one
hundred-year-old alliance in Spain between the PSOE and the UGT. Connie
September, vice-president of COSATU had been commissioned to do a report on the
state and future of trade unions. The report reflects on the relationship between party
and union in the following way:
"It is a relationship shaped by deep historical links and common struggles, but it is
not without its tensions and contradictions" (September Report, 1997).
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A closer examination of the alliance relationship reveals a different story, and instead
of talk of deep historical links, there are suspicions on both sides. Many people have
claimed that COSATU was a "front" organisation of the ANC. The launching of
COSATU was fraught with ideological tensions (Baskin, 1991: 49) Il. Many of the
new affiliates came from different political traditions, of which the congress tradition
of the ANC represented one amongst many. An excellent example of the complex
relationship between the ANC and COSATU had been the incident involving Jay
Naidoo, the then secretary-general of COSATU. The latter was invited to address a
World Council of Churches meeting in Zimbabwe when ANC members approached
him.
Upon hearing this story, there was an outcry in COSATU that Naidoo did not have
approval from the federation to meet ANC leaders. Certain factions believed that this
incident furthered perceptions that COSATU was taken over by populism (Baskin,
1991: 74). The fact that Naidoo were to become an important ANC member after
1994 gives some indication of the complexity of party and union relationship.
Reflecting on the relationship between COSATU and the ANC, Baskin states:
"Some observers have mistakenly accused COSATU of being a puppet in the hands of
the ANC and the SACP. In reality the process involved a dynamic two-way
relationship. COSATU's position on negotiations adopted at its 1989 congress was
vital in the drafting of the Harare declaration" (Baskin, 1991: 451).
The defence of the rights of workers meant that COSATU had to engage in political
struggle in South Africa. Although it was never a substitute for the ANC, it also never
took an anti-ANC position. The point of the discussion is to grasp the common
historical objectives that COSATU and the ANC had in common, without giving in to
notions that equate the two organisations. This is not to deny the common positions
II Jeremy Baskin was the national co-ordinator ofCOSATU in 1991. His reflections are valuable in
that this account of the history ofCOSATU is from an insider. The line that he takes implies that
although COSATU was inserted into the national political debate, it was never a substitute for the
ANC. The author reflects unceasingly on how unionists have guarded the independence of the
organisation.
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that the two organisations adopted in the struggle, but it does not resolve the fact that
COSATU has remained an independent organisation.V
In an interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation, Mbeki said the
following:
"The fundamental thing that brought everyone into the ANC was the goal that we
must end the system of racial domination in the country, and we must fight for a non-
racial democracy" (Antifa- Info-Bulletin, 1997).
He also said that there would be a time when the alliance relationship would end, but
he did not specify when the relationship would be terminated. Mbeki's statements do
not once reveal the claims of deep historical links that the September Report of 1997
makes. Similarly, when COSATU in the declaration statement on the alliance said
that the relationship is built on trust, it demanded that many new alliance structures be
put into place. The purpose of these new structures would be to subject the decisions
of the ANC leadership to thorough review, because there is a feeling that many ANC
leaders disregard the opinions of its own members and that of the alliance (COSATU,
1999).
When the government gave notice of its restructuring and privatisation plans, the
federation registered its protest at NEDLAC, and with FEDSAL and NACTU called
for a meeting between government and organised labour. The outcome of these
negotiations was the NFA, which in a way acted to constrain the state from privati sing
without informing the main trade union federations. The most visible evidence of the
shallowness of the social linkages is the fact that unlike the situation in Poland and
Argentina, there was no social pact in South Africa to initiate the restructuring and
privatisation programmes. COSATU has never agreed to the austerity measures of the
governing party, neither has it been consulted on major policy initiatives on the
12 The commonality between the ANCand COSATUwas reflected in the agreement to have a
substantial number of COSATU leaders on ANC party lists in the 1994 elections (Reynolds, 1994: 27).
Similarly, Buhlungu (1995: 90) indicates that in September 1993, the first 20 COSATU candidates
were announced. Many more COSATU leaders who would stand as ANC candidates for the various
regional parliaments followed.
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economy after 1994. In such a context, social linkages, if any, will hardly exercise a
stranglehold on the policy direction of the union concerning privatisation. This
evidence makes the present author to suggest that it is not altogether proper and
relevant to speak about social linkages when trying to explain the behaviour and
policy position of COSATU on privatisation. The link between the ANC and
COSA TU had been forged by the struggle against apartheid, and it appears as if the
connection should be thought of more in terms of ideas and ideals, rather than shared
identities and networks of close personal ties. The present author is of the opinion that
inasmuch as the alliance has held out, it did not determine the response of the
federation on restructuring and privatisation. This is the same as to say that these
apparent social linkages did not make COSATU politically acquiescent. This
therefore reduces the explanatory power of "social linkages" in predicting the
behaviour of COSATU on privatisation and restructuring.
Party Strength
The guiding proposition states that:
" ...[A] strong governing party and the absence of a viable political alternative for
labour is expected to encourage union co-operation" (Levitsky and Way, 1998: 182).
The ANC achieved a landslide in both the 1994 and the 1999 elections. The 1994
election saw it took 62% of the national vote, while in the 1999 election, it achieved
an even bigger margin of 66.5% (Electoral Institute of South Africa, 1999). In the
1999 election, it achieved massive majorities in seven of the nine provinces, except in
the Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal provinces. The other liberation movements
failed dismally at both the 1994 and the 1999 polls, and there is no reason to expect
that an alternative left political party to the ANC is soon emerging. The Pan Africanist
Congress (PAC) received only 5% of the vote in 1994 and 3% in 1999. The Azanian
People's Organisation (AZAPO) received only 1% of the national votes in 1999. The
rumpus created by the government's adoption of GEAR made many in the trade union
movement to ask about alternative possibilities to the ANC.
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The declaration went further in rejecting GEAR as an unsuitable macro-economic
policy for South Africa's economic transformation and it called on the ANC to adopt
a developmental macro-economic framework that is consistent with the principles of
the RDP. The federation also committed itself to resist the various elements of GEAR
like subsidy cuts, privatisation, and labour market flexibility. Shilowa (1997) made
the same comments in a speech at COSATU's policy conference when he attacked the
Koch (1994) said that COSATU unions emerged basically with three positions. The
majority view states that COSATU should remain in the alliance, but retain the right
to organise independent campaigns. The other view was that the labour federation
should pull out of the alliance and act as an independent political vehicle for the
working class. The third view advocates that COSATU and the SACP should form a
broad political movement to the left of the ANC. In spite of the last two views, most
members of the federation want it to stay in the alliance and to use its collective
strength to counter conservative forces in the ANC constraining the government's
welfare programs (Koch, 1994). Davis and Pearce (1996) report that Patrick Bond
who is a senior economist at NIEP says that the answer for the unions are not to form
an independent political organisation.
The economist is reputed to argue that trade unions should build a civil society with a
class- consciousness. Ka'Nkosi and Mbhele (1997) say that the cracks in the alliance
were brought about because of the ANC's shift to the right at the expense of the RDP.
They argue that the idea of a progressive left wing opposition and a socialist youth
wing has gained a lot of ground in COSATU and SACP structures.
What policy positions did COSATU adopt on the issue of GEAR and the restructuring
of the public sector? At the federation's 6th national congress the following
declaration was made on GEAR:
"GEAR represents a unilateral departure from the policies and the principles
enshrined in the Reconstruction and Development Programme" (COSATU National
Congress, 1997).
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inability of GEAR to create jobs, and he called on the government to imbue the state
with a developmental character. In spite of the militant rhetoric, COSATU's position
is far more complicated. At a meeting of the CEC of COSATU in 1996, the federation
accepted partial privatisation of state assets in certain sectors (Gebhart, 1996). The
CEC did however re-affirm its opposition to the wholesale privatisation of state
assets. The sectors that should not be privatised were indicated as post and
telecommunications, electricity, public transport, housing, health, water, state forests,
municipal services, education and roads. The bigger private sector unions in the
federation have reputedly engineered the apparent shift in COSATU' s policy on
privatisation (Gebhart, 1996).
One official of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) claims
that its union and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) were the main
architects in the shift of policy in COSATU. He also indicated that much of the
opposition to privatisation comes from the public sector unions (Gebhart, 1996). The
admission that some form of privatisation is necessary was followed up by another
CEC meeting in 1998 where the CEC complained that COSATU has been sidelined
politically (Ka' Nkosi, 1998).
The CEC argued that it had little say in the policy decisions taken by the ANC, and
that individual cabinet ministers make most policy decisions. The two examples give
some indication of the compromises that the federation had to make when confronted
with a ruling party that it supported in both elections thus far. The federation's latest
position on restructuring and privatisation is formulated thus:
"Whilst we should not adopt a blanket opposition to privatisation, there is a need to
analyse the direction employers both public and private is going, learn lessons from
countries where similar strategies have been adopted, and develop a bargaining and
campaigning strategy" (COSATU Special Congress, 1999).
The electoral dominance of the ANC has definitely brought about a moderation in the
policy orientation of COSATU on privatisation. Although the gradual shifts can be
partially credited to the manoeuvring of the bigger unions in the federation, the most
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devastating reason is probably COSATU's sidelining in the making of policy
decisions in the ANC and government. The re-affirmation of the alliance relationship
at the latest congress should be seen as a strategy that COSATU adopted to recoup
some of the lost influence. We should remember that COSATU's call for the
restructuring of the alliance relationship has come about because it wants to subject
the decisions of the ANC leadership to the review of newly proposed alliance
structures. This may have the effect of "controlling" some of the restructuring and
privatisation decisions of ANC leadership.
Haffejee (1999) is certainly correct when she argues that the alliance is not in danger
of breaking up because COSATU has decided that most of the battles will be fought
in the alliance. The present author therefore asserts that the electoral dominance or
party strength of the ANC reinforced the alliance and it somewhat constrained the
radical policy position of the federation on privatisation. The electoral dominance of
the ANC has however not succeeded in absolutely silencing COSATU, and the latter
is still in principle opposed to some forms of privatisation.
Leadership Overlap
The guiding proposition states that:
"[To] the extent that unions are effectively integrated into the party leadership,
labour should defect more slowly from the governing alliance" (Levitsky and Way,
1998: 183).
Organisational overlap and fusion brings to the fore the same issues of influence of
the alliance partner in the decision-making process. We have already noted
COSATU's complaints of its declining influence in the ANC, and how at its latest
congress, it planned to regain some of the lost ground. The ANC has made some
attempts to get people from the alliance into very influential positions. Jeremy Cronin
and Blade Nzimande of the SACP respectively head the transport and educational
portfolios in the national assembly (Chotia, 1999). Other notables in the SACP who
are heading portfolio committees are Yunis Carrim for provincial affairs and local
government, and Nathi Nhleko for public service and administration.
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Many in the COSATU leadership have after the 1994 election accepted posts in the
government of national unity, and Shilowa's appointment as the premier of the
Gauteng province is the latest example. We have earlier indicated that this process
was preceded by the ANC's strategy to co-opt a significant number of experienced
COSATU leaders by including them on the party lists in 1994. COSATU'S
lamentations about its declining influence in the ANC needs closer scrutiny. Levitsky
and Way (1998: 183) are suggesting that if union leaders are poorly integrated into the
party, they might begin to understand their interests as distinct from the party. This is
more likely to encourage defection. It is the present author's understanding that the
party should thus pursue an active role in ensuring that union leadership is well
represented in party structures.
In South Africa, it appears as if the labour federation is more vigorously pursuing
organisational integration with the ANC. The Shopsteward, one of COSATU's
publications makes the following comment:
"COSATU should have organisational representation on the ANC structures. The
ANC Lekgotla in January 1997 proposed that the ANC consider setting aside
COSATU seats on ANC constitutional structures. This would ensure that COSATU
leaders on such structures were seen to be directly representing the organisation
positions" (Shopsteward, 1997).
The Shopsteward (1997) goes on to argue that the federation should be represented at
every level in the ANC and even in the ANC's conference. There is here clearly an
attempt from COSATU to formalise and to regularise the relationship between it and
the ANC. The recent proposals to establish a National Political Centre together with
the call for new alliance structures suggest that it has played a far more active role in
attempting to institutionalise the alliance relationship. COSATU clearly sees greater
organisational overlap as one of the most effective ways to increase its influence, and
haul in some of the more conservative leaders in the ANC. The question then is how
COSATU's relatively poor integration into party structures affected its position on
restructuring and privatisation?
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COSA TU is of the opimon that the NFA should be re-negotiated to extend its
mandate to more than mere consultation with the unions by the government. The new
NFA should reflect on the role that the state enterprises should play in job creation
and outline the areas that should not be privatised (COSATU Special Congress,
1999). The organisational initiative to come out this should be what it calls an
"Alliance Syndicate." These alliance sector syndicates must link its affiliates in a
sector with an appropriate ANC sub-committee, the ANC minister responsible for
restructuring and the various alliance structures:
"This will help to re-appropriate the restructuring and transformation initiatives that
the government has unleashed thus far" (COSATU Special Congress, 1999).
It adds that the alliance structures should review the restructuring process and make
the necessary interventions. It should be clear from the exposition above that
COSATU feels that its absence from the major decision-making centres of
government has negatively impacted on its ability to influence meaningfully the
restructuring drive. The verdict is that in spite of its relative isolation and
marginalisation, there are no talks of defecting from the alliance. On the contrary,
there are attempts to strengthen it to enable better leverage on the restructuring
process. Levitsky and Way's framework predicts that such poor integration should
encourage defection, and this is clearly not the case here. The fact that the federation
is pinning its hopes on more democratic decision-making structures serves as
evidence of its continuing opposition to the privatisation of what it calls strategic
areas.
It is worth mentioning that COSATU is aware of the pitfalls of its members becoming
ordinary members of the ANC.13 These members are represented purely in their
personal capacity. COSATU has begun mooting the possibility of its members being
13 The leadership overlap debate was intense in labour circles. Some unionists felt that leadership
overlap would significantly weaken the trade union movement. Repeated calls have been made for the
independence of the unions (van Holdt, 1991; Zikalala, 1991; Callinicos, 1992).
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represented on all relevant ANC structures as COSATU members (COSATU, 1997).
This would enable the federation to mandate its members to represent the position of
the organisation, instead of being mere ANC members. It is clearly not enough to
have some of the union's leaders in the party, but there must be some formal and
regularised exchange between the two organisations. This drive to secure
representation in the ANC and alliance structures is an implicit admission that it is not
sufficient simply to have numbers in the governing party. It is far more important that
the voice of the organisation is heard in places where crucial policy decisions are
taken.
In spite of COSATU's drive for more representation on ANC and alliance structures,
this has not led to a change in the policy positions of the union on privatisation. Even
if it succeeds in effectively integrating itself into the ANC or new policy- making
units, it will only be to vigorously pursue its stated policies, instead of experiencing
an apostasy.
Union Competition
The guiding proposition states that:
"Labour competition encourages the defection of unions aligned with a governing
party" (Levitsky and Way, 1998: 184).
The assumption is that if competition increases between the unions, a process of
outbidding will radicalise unions as they are competing for members. South Africa
has three major federations, namely the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU), The Federation of Unions in South Africa (FEDUSA) and the National
Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). The first two federations are the largest in South
Africa. FEDUSA has 26 affiliated trade unions under its wing and with a total paid-up
membership of 541 088 (FEDUSA, 1999). COSATU on the other hand has 18
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affiliated trade unions with a total paid-up membership of 1.7 million (COSATU,
1999). The rise in splinter and independent trade unions has given rise to more
competition between the unions (Grawitzky, 1999). The author states that since the
introduction of the Labour Relations Act, the number of registered unions has doubled
from 282 to 500. COSATU, which once had a total membership of 2 million, has
dropped to a figure of 1.78 million.
Some labour analysts have earlier cautioned about the drop in membership, and it was
estimated that COSATU had experienced a 6% decline in membership two years after
the 1994 election (Davis and Pearce, 1996). lts membership then picked up to the 2
million mark, and then dropped to the current figure of 1.78 million. The National
Institute of Economic Policy has cautioned that trade unions need to start recruiting in
areas where they were not active before (Grawitzky, 1999). The manufacturing sector,
which once represented the biggest pool of membership for the unions, has suffered as
a result of the job losses in the industry. COSATU'S public service unions now
constitute 37% of total membership against the 27.7% in the manufacturing sector.
Ten years ago, the manufacturing sector constituted 55% of membership against the
6% in public service unions. (Grawitsky, 1999).
The NALEDI report urges unions to recruit in the service industry, which has seen the
biggest increase in employment, and it is also the sector where workers are the least
protected. This means that unions have to start thinking about recruiting more skilled
workers who are mostly employed on a casual and a contract basis.
Has increased competition affected the position that COSATU adopted on
restructuring and privatisation? In terms of the proposition, the federation is supposed
to engage in a far more robust manner to convince its members that it can protect their
interests.
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The SACP certainly thinks that this approach is related to the increased competition
that COSATU faces:
"We also need to understand that if the COSATU public sector affiliates do not
engage in a determined and relatively robust negotiation process, the FED USA 's and
other unions at the shop-jloor level will outflank them" (SACP National Strategy
Conference, 1999).
Although this statement is related to the specifics of the recent public wage dispute
between the government and the public sector unions, it implies that the federation
has become more radical in its approach given the competition at the shop floor. The
reality is that instead of a radical outbidding, COSATU and FEDUSA affiliated
unions have engaged in common campaigns. The Igoli 2002 plans by the JMC have
resulted in joint action by the SAMWU and the Independent Municipal and Allied
Trade Unions (IMATU), which is a FEDUSA affiliate. More importantly, the
positions that COSATU adopted have not changed significantly with the advent of
FEDUSA and other trade unions. This gives more support to the strategic and long-
term approach that COSATU assumed, and the present author therefore concludes
that there is as yet no significant radicalising impact on the position of COSATU
concerning restructuring and privatisation.
Balance of Dependence
The main proposition states that:
"Union responses to labour-backed adjustment are likely to be shaped by the degree
to which the privileges, positions, and power of labour leaders hinge on either the
discretion of government leaders, or rank-and-jile supporters" (Levitsky and Way,
1998: 184).
Levitsky and Way (1998: 184) show how organised labour's financial and political
dependence on government in Argentina provided government with a powerful stick
to discipline recalcitrant unions and to reward those that are loyal. The implicit
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assumption is that unions have less latitude in pursuing oppositional strategies if it is
financially dependent on government. COSATU and its affiliates strive for self-
sufficiency, and the federation only receives money from other unions when
conducting special projects. This means that the federation is largely financially
autonomous (COSATU, 1999). One of the principles of the federation is in fact paid-
up membership, because it argues that it wants to make decisions without the
interference from funders. This then takes care of the federation's relative
independence, not only from foreign funders, but also from the national government.
The natural assumption is then that the federation is far more sensitive and dependent
on the rank-and-file, but the situation on the ground reveals a different dynamic.
Forrest (1994) reports that union grassroots support felt that they are acting as some
kind of conveyer belt for decisions taken elsewhere. The author cites as evidence the
absence of mass campaigns and the proliferation of national negotiation forums. The
widening gap between the union leaders and the led has since not ceased (Grawitzky,
1999). The same article reports that the acting president of COSATU at its special
congress in August 1999 indicated that the federation lost much of its traditions of the
1980s and early 90s. He is of course referring to the tradition of consultation and
feedback to the rank-and-file. This gap between leadership and followers is equally
found in the ANC, where allegations are made that internal democracy in the party
had been crushed (Davis, 1996). The evidence suggests that the labour federation's
main policy positions after 1994 have not been mass-driven, and that the resulting
positions are by and large the result of negotiations between the political elite and the
labour elite.
The tendency for leaders in the ANC not to consult its own followers and members of
the alliance is perhaps repeated in the behaviour of union leaders. This would suggest
that if union leadership were more sensitive to the opinions of the rank-and-file, then
a different configuration of positions would have emerged on restructuring and
privatisation. The consequence of the relative lack of consultation of union leaders
with the rank-and-file, and its independence from the patronage of the ANC means
that union leadership and the federation as such, currently operates in some limbo.
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The most likely interpretation is that the consistency of its position on restructuring
and privatisation of core assets is a function mainly of leadership. It remains
therefore uncertain, especially with the election of new leadership, if the opposition to
the privatisation of core state assets is going to be maintained. The uncertainty would
be further exacerbated if there were genuine attempts to re-invigorate the importance
of the rank-and-file. The reconstruction of the importance of the rank-and-file should
be understood in the context of the alliance relationship. Concessions by COSATU to
the government, which have the potential to severely undermine the job security of its
members, could result in a backlash. It is difficult to speculate on the direction of such
a challenge and the kind of leadership that it would fashion. Ironically, it may simply
be a continuation of the very same policy positions of the trade union federation.
Levitsky and Way's variable assumes that union leaders are either bound by the
discretion of government or the rank-and-file, but the COSATU case has seemingly
"escaped" both of these influences. The present author therefore contends that the
federation's position on restructuring and privatisation cannot be predicted either from
an alliance point of view (party patronage), or from the dependence of leaders on the
rank-and-file.
2.3.3 THE RELEVANCE OF THE FRAMEWORK
We are now in a better position to answer the question about the ability of the
theoretical framework of Levitsky and Way to meaningfully elucidate the policy
positions of COSATU.
This framework, in the present author's opinion fails, on four accounts to make sense
of the position that COSATU took with respect to restructuring and privatisation. The
supposed social linkages that so many partisan unionists and political commentators
speak about have not made COSATU or the SACP accept the fundamental premises
of the neo-liberal economic framework. This non-acceptance finds its way in the
policies of opposition to wholesale privatisation, and privatisation of "core assets" of
the state. The analysis also found that leadership overlap is not enough to affect the
policy direction of the labour federation. What came out in such limpid fashion was
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that it matters far more if the federation is part of the policy-making and decision-
making structures of the ANC. COSATU'S admission that it has been exiled from the
inner circle of influence and power bears testimony to the insignificance of leadership
overlap in South Africa. In spite of the many strategic positions that some SACP
members occupy in parliament or on the ANC's executive committee, its own
influence on policy is negligible. Leadership overlap is not the main factor sustaining
the alliance, but it is rather active presence and influence in the decision-making
structures of government. COSATU' s position on privatisation is framed around the
premise that more democratic alliance structures will pronounce more favourably on
its own stated positions. Union competition, inasmuch as it has stiffened, has not yet
produced a radicalising effect on the federation's policy positions.
There seems to be a consistent opposition to wholesale privatisation and the
privatisation of core assets prior to and after, the establishment of FEDUSA. The
analysis also found that the labour federation has been relatively autonomous from
both government leaders and the rank-and-file in terms of the positions on
privatisation that it formulated. There is no evidence to suggest that government's
patronage has softened the position of the federation. There is also little evidence of
an ultra radical membership demanding that COSATU should principally oppose
privatisation in all its forms. Union leadership has assumed much of the direction and
the impetus of the various policies in the post-1994 period. The dichotomy of
government discretion or rank-and-file rule presented by the framework is simply not
applicable to the party-union relationship after the 1994 election.
The only variable in the framework that communicates something about COSATU's
position is the party strength of the ANC. The outcome of the debates within
COSATU has re-affirmed the need for the alliance, and the idea of a left political
party has been shelved. Pressure from domestic business, opposition political parties
and the absence of a viable alternative to the ANC has forced the federation to
concede at least some form of partial privatisation. This concession was not however
tantamount to an acceptance of wholesale privatisation or the privatisation of core
state assets. In answering the question about the dominant characteristic of the
federation's engagement, the following transpired. COSATU has decided that
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negotiation with the government on restructuring and privatisation will continue. This
is signified by its eager remarks about the introduction of an NFA II. There are
pockets of "opposition" in the federation, and represented by SAMWU in particular,
but this is not the dominant position of the federation. The federation's commitment
to negotiation in NFA II is a strategic move aimed at constraining the restructuring
and privatisation drive.
The present author interprets this position as an implicit acceptance that
retrenchments are unavoidable, and negotiations are meant to distribute the social and
economic costs, and to do so over a longer period. The party strength of the ANC and
the absence of any viable political alternative force this commitment to negotiations
on privatisation. This leads the present author to conclude then that the dominant
characteristic of the federation is indeed "co-operation" and will remain so in the
nearby future.
2.4SUMMARY
Privatisation was initiated for diverse reasons in the developing countries. In some
cases, the purpose was merely to signal the change from a command-led economy to a
free market economy. In the other cases, historical wrongs, such as the dispossession
of property had to be corrected. Many of the countries in the former Eastern
Communist block took the route of mass privatisation, which meant the cheap sale of
public enterprise equities.
Many of the privatisation exercises had gone aground as a result of the social
instability unleashed, and governments found it difficult to cope with managing the
transition. Unemployment was therefore one of the main reasons why the privatisation
programme had to be slowed down in Russia. One of the most important driving
forces behind privatisation in the developing world was enduring fiscal crises that so
many countries suffered. Privatisation was seen as one of the most fundamental fiscal
solutions in remedying the crippling budget deficit. Privatisation was hampered in
many of these developing countries as a result of the absence of a legal framework
within which privatisation could take place. Many of these countries never had
provisions for the existence of private property. The evidence indicates that there have
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been many successes in the field of financial discipline, particularly in Brazil, Mexico
and Argentina. In most of the privatisation exercises, organised labour had been
sidelined and it is only recently that trade unions in Poland and Spain are rejecting the
adverse consequences of privatisation. South Africa started its privatisation
programme in 1987 as a short-term strategy to deal with its isolation from the world
financial markets.
The programmes then had as its component aims a reduction in the scope and size of
the public sector and the active revival of the private sector. The results of the
programme show that unemployment has increased, and very few of the anticipated
efficiency gains had been made. It is precisely the inability of the private sector to
contribute to employment creation that led the current government to the GEAR
macro-economic policy. Government's restructuring programme has met with a lot of
opposition and criticism from both organised labour and business. The major
obstacles were a lack of clear privatisation guidelines and the absence of a legal
framework. There are indications that government has begun to accelerate the pace of
the privatisation programme.
The latest plans of the government include the sale of a further 10% of TELKOM and
its flotation in 2001. The major labour federation, COSATU has in principle agreed to
partial privatisation, but it still opposes wholesale privatisation and the privatisation of
core state assets. It called for the strengthening of the alliance as a way of constraining
the restructuring drive. At least, in terms of its operating principle, COSATU seems
committed to further negotiation with government on the issue of restructuring, and it
has repeated its calls for the introduction of an NFA II.
The next chapter will examine the distribution of opinions on the Opinion Leadership
Survey of 1997/8. COSATU's position will be described at first, and then the
differences between COSATU and the ANC are going to be examined.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION
3.1 The Data
The data analysis is based on The South African National Leadership Opinion Survey
of 1997/8. The opinion-leader survey forms part of a longitudinal study by the Centre
for International and Comparative Politics of the University of Stellenbosch which
has been conducted annually since 1989/90. This postal survey was completed
between October 1997 and February 1998.
Table 1:Composition of Opinion Leader Sample
Sector Composition of sectors Sample
National Assembly Members of the National Assembly 399
NCOP All permanent members of the NCOP 57
Provincial Government Premiers and MECs 95
Civil Service Directors-general and senior directors 181
SAPS Commissioners and assistant commissioners 78
SANDF Senior members of army, navy and airforce 64
Business CEOs and Directors from top 100 companies, based on 172
market capitalisation
Media Print media (editors and senior journalists) and electronic 96
media (senior managers)
Trade Unions Most senior members of COSATU and affiliates 50
Total Realised response = 477 (40%) 1192
A positional sample of opinion-leaders or the elite was selected from nine of the most
important sectors of society. In other words, people holding top positions in these
sectors were included in the sample. (See Table 1 for the sectors selected.) What
follows now is a description of the application of the technique. In the civil service
sector, a team of political scientists consisting of academics from the University of
Stellenbosch, Fort Hare and University of Transkei identified the 181 top positions of
the most important departments.
The questionnaires were sent to the individuals holding these positions - that is why
this kind of approach is called the "positional approach". A positional sample of 1192
individuals was selected. It is virtually impossible, however, to determine the
boundaries of some sectors. How many trade union leaders or business people must
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be included, for example? Do all these people have the same degree of power and/or
influence? It is important to note that the selection of the number of persons depended
on certain assumptions about the configuration of power and influence on the national
level as well as within the sectors themselves. The grand total as well as the number
of persons selected per sector may be regarded as arbitrary - except for parliament,
where all the members were included.
Data gathering took place in a structured way. It was primarily the cost factor that
played an important role in the decision to use mailed questionnaires as the method of
data gathering for this study rather than personal interviews. In order to overcome the
familiar problem of a low response rate, various techniques, including three waves of
questionnaires, were used to push this rate higher than the usual average of 30% in
elite studies. The final response rate was 40% (477 persons from a realised sample of
1192), which makes relatively reliable deductions from the data possible. (See also
Kotze and Hill, 1998 for an additional description of the survey).
3.2 The Procedure
This section will answer two questions. The first of these questions examines whether
the official policy positions of COSATU on restructuring and privatisation find
expression in the opinions of labour leaders. The second question traces differences
between the ANC and COSATU on GEAR and privatisation. The analysis will place
emphasis not only on differences between party and union, but also looks at
differences within the two organisations, if any. The future of privatisation in South
Africa will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.3 Method of Analysis
The two principal methods used were factor analysis and reliability testing in the
development of index variables for the GEAR and privatisation items in the survey.
The factor analysis was used to identify the important factors or components in the
data as well as identifying the items that loaded significantly on these factors.
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The basic analysis started by observing the relevant items for its "face validity" or
logical validity (Babbie, 1996: 164). The section on GEAR in the Opinion Survey of
1997/8 contains 12 items. Item 79, which states that "The Rand should be
strengthened relative to other monetary units", was eliminated immediately. The
reasons were that it featured very little in the ongoing dispute between government
and labour and that it has no direct bearing on the ideological struggle between
government and labour. A principal component factor analysis was conducted on the
11 items. The rotated factor matrix produced the following components:14
Table 2: Orthogonal Factor Loading Matrixfor 11GEAR Items
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor3
Make labour markets .761
more flexible
Do away with .649
exchange controls
Import tariffs removed .639
more rapidly
Limit increases in .611
wages and salaries
Limit government .602
sector employment
High positive real .502
interest rates necessary
to curb inflation
Reduce budget deficit .468 .337
Redistribute through .433 .368 .346
employment-creation
in private sector
Investment must be .804
increased
Manufactured exports .737
must be increased
Public works .846
programmes important
for job creation
14 Only items with a loading of above .3 are included in this table
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These 11 items were then included in various reliability tests to determine the internal
consistency of the items. The justification was that the 11 items are distributed across
the three factors, and conform to the cutting-off point of .30 for inclusion. The idea
behind reliability testing is to examine the internal consistency of the new variable.
This would increase our confidence that the items in the index measure the same
concept, trait or attitude. Babbie (1996: 181) recommends a reliability coefficient
(alpha) of .90 as a rule of thumb, but recognises that the decision for this criterion is
arbitrary. The present author has set alpha values of above .80 as acceptable in the
construction of the index.
Reflecting on the factor analysis, the first factor accounts for 28.75% of the variance,
the second factor 11.01%, and the third factor 10.05%. The first factor seems to
encompass the heart of the macro-economic program, and it seems to indicate free
market economic orthodoxy. All the important elements of neo-liberal economic
reforms seem to be present here. IS The second factor seems to indicate a distinct trade
component. The few items that significantly load on it means that one should not
make too much of it. The third factor is even more obscure, especially given the high
loading of one item and the relatively low loading of the other two items. It would
have been appropriate to refer to this dimension as the employment factor, but this
interpretation is made difficult by the budget deficit item. It is hard to imagine the
connection between the creation of employment and the reduction of the deficit.
The interpretation of this dimension remains unclear, and the present author suggests
that perhaps we should term it the employment factor in spite of the deficit item. For
analytical purposes, it is more important to focus on the first factor. One of the
striking features of this factor is the implicit reduction in the scope and size of the
state. The core of this factor seems to indicate the need to open up more spaces for the
private sector, and the concomitant reduction of the role of the state. This after all is
15 The strength of the first factor was borne out when an oblique rotation was carried out. The only
correlation was between factor 1 and factor 2, and the correlation was very modest (.239). There was
no correlation between factors 1 and 3, or between factors 2 and 3. This confirms the independence of
the first factor and lends further defmition to the neo-liberal economic preferences of the respondents in
the survey.
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the very nub of what drove privatisation programmes across the globe. This factor
seems to give definition and shape to the economic preferences of the majority of
leaders in the entire sample. This acceptance of the minimalist role of the state is the
overall climate of opinion in which we have to examine the responses of the
COSATU leaders. 16
Returning to the reliability tests, the first test was conducted with Il items, but the
results indicated that if items 76 and 86 were removed, the reliability coefficient
would be increased (first test: alpha = .6967).17 Upon removal of the two mentioned
items, the reliability coefficient improved considerably (second test: alpha = .7466).
Subsequent tests gave reduced alphas, and a decision was made to construct the index
with the remaining 9 items. The 9 items essentially covered the entire range of the
themes that GEAR addresses.
All the items in the GEAR section were originally coded in the same direction. This
meant that there was no need to change the original coding of the items. The analysis
took the presence of small values as indicative of a pro-GEAR position, and all the
items conformed to this requirement. The new composite measure had a range
running from 9 to 44. The decision was to give the four response categories more or
less the same bandwidth. This was done to ensure that all the main response
categories would have sufficient cases for analysis. The "uncertain" category was kept
very small to prevent an inordinate amount of cases falling in this category. The new
index variable was re-coded with the following intervals: 9-15 (Strongly Agree), 16-
23 (Agree), 24-27 (Uncertain), 28-34 (Disagree) and 35-44 (Strongly Disagree).
16 It is interesting to note that in the composite measure of GEAR, 79.2% of all the respondents endorse
the different elements of GEAR against 7.3% who disagree with it (totals are the collapsed agree and
disagree categories).
17 Item 76 states that "Investment must be increased" and item 86 states that "Public works
programmes are important for job creation."
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The section on the broad privatisation themes contains 7 original items. On face value
alone, all seven items were selected for the reliability tests. The principal component
factor analysis that was carried out on seven privatisation items yielded one factor.
This factor accounted for 54.63% of the variance.P Three of the items had to be re-
coded to ensure that all the items were running in the same direction, namely items
115, 118 and 120. A high score on this new variable was indicative of a pro-
privatisation position. The first test produced an alpha of .8863 and suggested that
items 116, 117 and 121 be removed to increase the reliability coefficient.l"
Subsequent tests have not led to higher reliability coefficients (test 2: alpha = .8846,
test 3: alpha= .8707).
The new composite measure of privatisation had a range running from 7-35. The
following intervals apply: 7-12 (Strongly Disagree), 13-18 (Disagree), 19-22
(Uncertain), 23-28 (Agree), and 29-35 (Strongly Agree). It is interesting to note that
the privatisation index has a relatively higher reliability than the GEAR index, but it
could be related to the fact that the Gear index has more variables. The decision to
persist with the items in the Gear index is motivated by the fact that all these items
cover a distinct and essential part of the overall Gear macro-economic programme.
We now tum to the first of the two questions in this section.
3.4 Research Question 1: Do the policy positions of COSATU find expression in
the attitudes and opinions of its leaders in South Africa?
This question takes its cue from the literature review that suggests that leaders in
COSATU had a formative impact on the policy direction of the federation. If the
18 The items that loaded on this factor are "More industries should be privatised" - .790, "Trade unions
should oppose privatisation" .788, "Privatisation is necessary to reduce the budget deficit" - .787,
"privatisation is necessary for productivity in the parastatals" - .782, "Privatisation will lead to a higher
level of unemployment" .730, "Privatisation means lower wages for semi-and unskilled workers" .680,
and "privatisation will mean higher consumer prices for services" .594.
19 Item 116 states that "Privatisation will mean higher consumer prices for services", item 117 states
that "Privatisation will lead to a higher level of unemployment" and item 121 states that "privatisation
will mean lower wage levels for semi- and unskilled workers."
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opinions of the leaders are consistent and confirm official policy positions, then this
will go some way towards endorsing the view of the internal leadership hegemony in
COSATU. The question will focus on leaders' opinions of the role of the state in the
economy, their position on GEAR, and their opinions on selected public utilities.
These issues have been chosen, because COSATU has official policy positions on it,
and the purpose of the analysis is to establish its empirical manifestation in the
attitudes of COSATU leaders.
The Role of the State
The final resolution on the alliance program states that COSATU should encourage an
active interventionist and developmental state. The state should play an active role in
the economy and society and the idea of a minimalist state is rejected (COSATU
Special Congress, 1999). This position has been affirmed in previous COSATU
conferences and policy statements and should therefore be regarded as one of the
pillars ofCOSATU'S economic vision. An item measuring this dimension states:
"There are different views on the role of the state towards the economy. An important
aspect is the extent to which the state, under the new constitutional dispensation,
should be allowed to control the economy. Views on this issue vary from those who
advocate total state control over the economy to completely free enterprise. Please
mark a point on the scale which coincides with your preference"
This item has "full state control" on the left pole and "completely free enterprise" on
the right pole. In the centre of the item is "mixed economy." The modal response for
the entire sample on this item is "50", which falls under the mixed economy
response (42.6% or 20 of COSATU leaders chose this option, N=47). Overall, more
of the COSATU responses are found to the left of the item, somewhere between full
state control and the mixed economy. There are very few responses to the "completely
free enterprise" part of the item (less than 22% of the total responses). There seems to
be an emphatic endorsement of the developmental role of the state in the economy. It
is, however, impossible to deduct from this item alone, exactly how the state should
intervene. The responses merely indicate a predilection for the active role of the state.
The distribution of opinions on this item, and in particular the modal response
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suggests that COSATU leaders foresee an important role for the private sector. The
data do not support the notion of an anti-private sector labour federation.
The Position of Leaders on GEAR
The factor analysis that was carried out made it clear to the reader that the majority of
respondents in the survey foresee some reduction in the role of the state. This is the
overall climate of opinion in which the COSATU responses on GEAR must be
understood. GEAR has been rejected as an unsuitable macro-economic strategy for
South Africa's socio-economic transformation by COSATU. The relevant declaration
states explicitly that certain elements of GEAR like wholesale privatisation and labour
market flexibility should be rejected (COSATU National Congress, 1997).
Table 3: COSATU Leaders on the Macro-economic Strategy GEAR
COSATU Responses: Raw Numbers and
Percentages
Agree 4
8.2%
Uncertain 10
20.4%
Disagree 27
55.1%
Strongly Disagree 8
16.3%
Total N=49
100%
The two disagree categories indicate that 71.4% of the COSATU leaders in the survey
are rejecting GEAR. This rejection of GEAR follows therefore the policy position of
the federation, but it is important to note that this rejection is punctuated by
moderation in some of the items. One of the most contested issues in GEAR is the
possibility that government intends to relax some of the measures in the existing
labour law regime. COSATU leaders are expected to strongly reject any attempts that
aim at making the labour market more flexible.
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Departing from the composite measure of GEAR, and in isolating one of the items,
we obtain the following results:
Table 4: COSATU Leaders on Labour Market Flexibility
COSATU:
Raw Numbers and Percentages
Strongly Agree 2
4%
Agree 14
28%
Uncertain 6
12%
Disagree 18
36%
Strongly Disagree 10
20%
Total N=50
100%
If we collapse the strongly disagree and the disagree responses, then 56% of
COSATU leaders reject the statement that labour markets should be made more
flexible. Although these responses are in the majority, the rejection of labour market
flexibility is not overwhelming, and this is a bit surprising. Those who are in
agreement with the statement constitute 32% of the total sample. There is here no
complete hegemony of opinion on this issue, and given the fact that decentralised
bargaining is an outflow of flexibility, the responses are all the more surprising.
This position is further complicated when we examine item 86, which states that
"Public works programmes are important for job creation." If we collapse the two
agree categories, 96% or 48 COSATU leaders agree to this statement. The
interpretation of the meaning of this item is not so clear. Public works programmes
can of course be exclusively government-led, or it can involve public-private
partnerships. The present author is suggesting that we interpret this item as not
necessarily excluding the private sector. The reasons are that COSATU leaders
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20 The Presidential Job Summit of 1998 gave in its own way expression to the importance of Public-
Private Partnerships. An excellent review of the concept can be found in Moore, C. and Pierre, 1.
(1988) "Partnership or Privatisation? The political economy of local economic restructuring" Policy
and Politics 16(3): 169-178
endorsed a mixed economy and seem to support the role of the private sector in
creating jobs. The favourable pronouncement on the private sector does not mean that
labour leaders see the public sector as dwindling. There is a very interesting tension
here: the support for the private sector to create jobs would in some way mean the
reduction in the size and scope of the public sector. This is clearly not the view of the
labour leaders in the sample, and it reinforces the suspicion that the concept of a
public-private partnership is fairly well established with unionists. This position takes
as its point of departure the idea that pro- and anti-privatisation arguments have its
merits and that one should not be supportive or opposed to privatisation purely on
ideological grounds alone (White, 1988: 19)_2oThe results of the survey thus far
confirm the current policy positions of COSATU. The present author has argued that
the rejection of GEAR is not tantamount to a complete rejection of the role of the
private sector. The federation's leaders seem to take positions that favour
employment-creation for workers, irrespective if it is the public sector or the private
sector.
Opposition to the Privatisation of "Strategic State Assets"
The Program of Action adopted by COSATU at its mid-year inaugural central
committee makes the following statement on privatisation:
"COSATU will campaign against privatisation, and attempts to move towards
privatisation of strategic state assets, which are responsible for the delivery of basic
social services, or are key to the state's ability to intervene in the economy"
(COSATU Inaugural CC, 1999).
Campaigns have been planned against the privatisation of ESKOM, elements of
transport and the delivery of municipal services (COSATU Inaugural CC, 1999). The
very same policy commitment was made in the previous year as well (Inaugural CC,
1998). The Opinion Survey of 1997 asks the respondent whether he/she believes the
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following parastatals should be nationalised or privatised: Spoomet, Portnet, Iscor,
Eskom SAA, Telkom and SABC. We are going to look at Spoomet, Telkom and
Eskom, because all three are falling into domains that COSATU has indicated should
not be privatised. The results for Eskom reveal the following:
Table 5: Should Eskom be Fully Privatised or Fully Nationalised?
COSATU:
Raw Numbers and Percentages
Privatised 4
8.2%
Nationalised 45
91.8%
Total N=49
100%
We witness here an almost complete rejection of the privatisation of the electricity
utility. The TELKOM data reveal a similar pattern in that 89.8% or 44 of COSATU
leaders opt for the nationalisation of the telecommunications utility. The most
emphatic rejection of privatisation of a public utility is found for SPOORNET:
Table 6: Should Spoornet be Fully Privatised or Fully Nationalised?
COSATU:
Raw Numbers and Percentages
Privatised 3
6.1%
Nationalised 46
93.9%
Total 49
100%
In the previous section, although the response of the labour leaders was anticipated, it
has not manifested this near complete rejection of the privatisation of public utilities.
The labour leaders in this sample are unanimous on the need to protect the public
utilities against privatisation, and so in their views, continue to deliver affordable
services to the poor masses in South Africa. The policy position of opposition to the
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privatisation of core state assets finds very clear expression in the opinions of the
labour leaders. The question about the empirical manifestation of the policy positions
of COSATU in the opinions of its leaders is answered in the affirmative. The
responses of the COSATU labour leaders in the sample consistently confirm the
decisions that have been taken at the federation's congresses. There is little evidence
of splits between public and private sector unions in the opinions of the labour
leaders. COSATU leaders are unanimous in their rejection of GEAR, their acceptance
of the developmental state and the preservation of public utilities in the hands of the
state.
The data seem to provisionally lend support to the idea that leaders in COSATU have
fundamentally shaped the policy direction of the federation apropos GEAR.
3.5 Research Question 2: Are the opinions and attitudes of COSATU leaders
significantly differentfrom that of ANC leaders?
This question will examine in a comparative way, the positions of the party and the
trade union federation on GEAR and the privatisation of the mentioned public
utilities. Thereafter, the focus will be on broad privatisation themes. We have already
established that there are no significant differences within COSATU, and so this
section will take its cue from party-union differences.
Comparing Opinions on GEAR
The analysis in the previous section has established COSATU's firm rejection of
GEAR, and given the tussles between it and the governing party, one expects the
differences on GEAR to be pronounced. It would be interesting to see if the ANC
leaders in the survey are in fundamental agreement with the majority view in this
survey on basic macro-economic principles.
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Table 7: Comparing the ANC and COSATU on GEAR by Using the GEAR Index
ANC: Raw Numbers and COSATU: Raw Numbers and
Percentages Percentages
Strongly Agree 10
7.2%
Agree 94 4
68.1% 8.2%
Uncertain 22 10
15.9% 20.4%
Disagree 9 27
6.5% 55.1%
Strongly Disagree 3 8
2.2% 16.3%
Totals N= 138 N=49
100% 100%
The ANC response shows that 75.3% of all its leaders are in agreement with the
macro-economic strategy. It is interesting to note that most of these responses are in
the "agree" category and not in its extreme version. The ANC and its alliance partner
are in almost perfect opposition to each other on GEAR. There seems to be greater
support for free market orthodoxy in the ANC than in COSATU. It remains an open
question whether this support for neo-liberal economic orthodoxy will be translated
into a pro-privatisation position. Before examining the distribution of opinions on
privatisation, opinions on selected public utilities will be looked at first.
In order to maintain consistency in the text, we will examine the distribution of
opinions on the privatisation/nationalisation of Eskom first:
Table 8: The ANC and COSATU on the Privatisationl Nationalisation of Eskom:
ANC:% COSATU: %
Privatised 44.4 8.2
Nationalised 49.6 91.8
No Answer 5.9
Total 100% 100%
N=135 N=49
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Those who support the nationalisation of ESKOM in the ANC enjoy a relatively small
majority margin. In contrast to the position of the leaders in COSATU, the ANC is
fissured in terms of the support that nationalisation or privatisation enjoys. The two
organisations cannot almost be further away from each other in terms of
organisational dynamics. When we compare the positions on the privatisation of
TELKOM, a broadly similar pattern obtains. The only difference here is that those
who support the privatisation of TELKOM in the ANC are in the majority (57.8%
against the 37.5% percent who support nationalisation). In COSATU, there is an
overwhelming support for the nationalisation of TELKOM (an overwhelming 89.8%
against 10.2%). When we examine the distributions of opinions on SPOORNET,
more or less of the same pattern is repeated:
Table 9: The ANC and COSATU on the PrivatisationlNationalisation of Spoornet
ANC:% COSATU: %
Privatised 41.9 6.1
Nationalised 53.7 93.9
No Answer 4.4
Total 100 100
N=136 N=49
What separates the ANC from COSATU in the three cases seems to be the presence
of counter-balancing forces, which render the outcome of the contest between
privatisation and nationalisation uncertain. It is highly probable that the influence of
the emerging African middle class impresses itself here, and it is manifested on all
three items. We should remember that those who support nationalisation in the ANC
are not COSATU or SACP members, and therefore constitute yet another block in the
ANC camps. The suspicion is that it could be various left groupings that do not
believe in the new brand of capitalism so fervently supported by the new black middle
class (Haffejee, 1999). There is no question about the obvious differences between the
ANC and COSATU on the privatisation of these utilities, and we shall now turn to
broader privatisation issues.
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Comparing Opinions on Privatisation
Table 10: The ANC and COSA TU on Privatisation Index
ANC: Raw Numbers and COSATU: Raw Numbers and
Percentages Percentages
Strongly Disagree 8 24
6.1% 49%
Disagree 23 20
17.6% 40.8%
Uncertain 28 3
21.4% 6.1%
Agree 52 2
39.7% 4.1%
Strongly Agree 20
15.3%
Totals N = 131 N=49
100% 100%
If we collapse the "agree" categories for the ANC, then 55% of ANC leaders are of
the opinion that privatisation should be endorsed. The "disagree" responses constitute
23.7% of the responses, and together with the 21.4% of undecided leaders, it would
appear as if privatisation is far from being a completely settled issue in the ANC. We
find here a remarkable difference between the emphatic support for GEAR and the
lukewarm acceptance of privatisation. The dynamics on this variable repeat the
pattern that was found with the public utilities items. The ANC is clearly fissured in
terms of these issues, and the differences within the organisation are surprising. The
embrace of the neo-liberal economic orthodoxy has not led to the full acceptance of
privatisation.
COSATU leaders on the other hand overwhelmingly reject privatisation, and it is
important to note that the majority of the responses fall into the "strongly disagree"
category. The difference between the ANC and COSATU is now confirmed, but the
differences within the ANC are now more pronounced. It is difficult to predict how
the position of the ANC leaders is going to change, and to give the reader some
indication of the abrupt shifts, we will look at two of the privatisation items
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separately. Item 117 states that "Privatisation will lead to a higher level of
unemployment. "
Table 11: The ANC and COSATU on Privatisation and Unemployment
ANC:% COSATU: %
Strongly Agree 9.5 42.0
Agree 29.9 50.0
Uncertain 16.8 6.0
Disagree 39.4 2.0
Strongly Disagree 1.5
No Answer 2.9
Total 100 100
N=137 N=50
The largest majority in COSATU is in agreement with the statement (92%), and it
confirms the leaders' consistent fears about retrenchment. The ANC is almost
perfectly balanced on this item as 40.9% disagree against the 39.4% who answer in
the affirmative. We should note that the uncertain group has 16.8% of the responses,
and that it can swing the opinion decisively one way or the other. The analysis thus
far has not failed to point to the deep splits in the ANC on the selected privatisation
themes. The presence of the undecided group has a number of implications for the
understanding and the analysis of privatisation, and we will return to it in the
following chapter. COSATU leaders have been consistent in their opinions, not only
in this section, but also in the preceding sections.
Sometimes, the complexity of the ANC's opinion on privatisation is swung in the
opposite direction. Item 119 states that "Trade unions should do all that is in their
power to oppose privatisation." This is once again one of the difficult items to
interpret. This item does not specify if privatisation should be opposed in principle, or
if some of the unpalatable elements should be resisted. This is made more difficult by
the fact that COSATU conceded to some form of partial privatisation as early as
1996. On the mere face of it, COSATU leaders have unanimously come out against
privatisation (94% agree with the statement).
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A mere 18.2% of ANC respondents agrees with the statement against the 64.3% who
disagrees with the statement. The uncertain group constitutes 16.1% of the responses,
and again this is almost the same as those who agree with the statement. ANC leaders
clearly do not foresee a blanket opposition to privatisation, but this does not mean that
there are no concerns about the negative social and economic consequences of
privatisation. There is unevenness to the opinions of ANC leaders on privatisation,
and their responses do not tally with the unambiguous support for GEAR. The internal
cohesion of the COSATU responses on the other hand reinforces the view of the
hegemony of leadership in the federation.
The pattern that emerges from the analysis is of difference between the ANC and
COSATU on privatisation, and differences within the ANC on privatisation. This
reminds the present author of the claim of so-called social linkages between party and
union, and yet these results cast considerable doubt on the veracity of such claims.
Inasmuch as we would assert this, it is not tantamount to denying the equally large
splits in the ANC. The argument that will be put forward in the next chapter will have
much to say about the tensions in the ANC and how COSATU has positioned itself to
take advantages of these differences.
3.6SUMMARY
COSATU leaders have come out in full support of the policy positions of the labour
federation. The literature review has hinted at the possibility of splits within the
federation on privatisation issues. No evidence has been found to suggest that there
are various camps within COSATU, nor does it appear if unionists adopt ad-hoc
positions on privatisation. Leaders in the federation firmly support the notion of a
developmental state, and also believe that the economy should include elements of
both the public and the private sector. It would appear that inasmuch as the state is
conceptualised as having to playa developmental role, unionists believe that both the
public and the private sector should be involved in creating employment.
The fear that privatisation is going to mean job losses came out clearly in the data,
and unionists have been consistent in their rejection of retrenchment as a consequence
of privatisation. Labour leaders overwhelmingly disapproved of GEAR, and there was
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a strong feeling that those public utilities in electricity, telecommunications and public
transport need to stay in the hands of the public sector. Overall, the labour leaders in
the sample have exhibited a remarkable support for the official policy of the
federation and the consistency cuts across the different items in the survey.
Comparatively, the ANC and COSATU are poles apart in terms of their distribution
of opinions on the items that we have examined. There are deep splits in the ANC, not
only on the privatisation of the public utilities, but also on the broader issues of
privatisation. The ANC leaders firmly endorsed the macro-economic strategy GEAR,
but fell short of emphatic support for privatisation.
Much of this suggests that privatisation is still an unsettled issue for ANC leaders, and
COSATU's decision to shore up alliance structures must surely depend on this
unstable aspect in ANC leadership as well. Overall, though the splits in the ANC are
recognised, the difference between party and the trade union federation remains
significant. Although there is very little evidence to suggest that party and union are
moving closer to each other in terms of their respective policy views, the unstable
distribution of opinions in the ANC holds out just that promise. We will now turn to a
more thorough discussion of the results, and at the same time attempt to look at the
future of privatisation in South Africa.
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The results have in part confirmed this proposition. The assignment has indicated how
the differences between COSATU and the ANC are stark on GEAR. Although the
ANC leaders in the sample were less convincing on the privatisation index, the
differences between it and COSATU were significant. There is no doubt that the data
have added the complication of differences within the ANC concerning privatisation.
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
This chapter will set out to discuss the results of the data and the earlier evidence on
the alliance relationship. The purpose is to develop a deeper understanding of the
fundamental dynamics that drove the policy decisions of COSATU. In addition, the
chapter will examine the question about the future of privatisation in South Africa.
Pertinent to this question would be the framework of Levitsky and Way (1998) and
the results of the data on the opinions of COSATU and ANC leaders. Our first focus
will be on commenting on the results of the data in the context of the three
propositions that were expounded in Chapter 1.
4.1 The Propositions in the Context of the Results
Proposition 1 states that "An essentially negative or positive policy position on
privatisation will translate into a similar negative or positive opinion and attitude in
the South African National Leadership Opinion Survey of 1997/98."
This proposition assumes some continuity between the formal congress policy
positions and its expression in the survey. All the official policy positions of
COSATU on privatisation and restructuring have found confirmation in the views of
the COSATU leaders in the survey. This concerns the developmental role of the state,
rejection of GEAR, and opposition to the privatisation of strategic state assets. The
only exception to these uniform responses has been the less than overwhelming
rejection of labour market flexibility. The first proposition has therefore been
confirmed.
Proposition 2 states that "Differences are more likely to manifest between party and
union, rather than differenceswithin the respective organisations."
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The assignment has however taken the position that these differences do not
overshadow the differences between COSATU and ANC leaders on privatisation. The
distribution of opinions of ANC leaders on privatisation appears erratic in contrast to
the uniformity found within COSATU. In spite of these complications, the second
proposition has also been confirmed.
The data in the survey lend tremendous weight to this thesis and confirm the internal
hegemony of COSATU leadership in the post-1994 period. This confirmation is found
in the uniform responses of labour leaders to the different items that we have
examined. There is very little evidence of deviance from a modal response on any of
these items. Understanding the reaction of the federation to the privatisation initiatives
The third proposition will be discussed in the section on the future of privatisation.
We will now examine the results in more detail in the next section.
4.2 Implications of the Comparative Analysis
The opinions of COSATU leaders are suggesting the near imperviousness of the top
brass of the organisation to influences outside the ambit of the federation. The
common embrace of the developmental role of the state and the unanimous rejection
of GEAR evoke the image of a disciplined soldier. It is almost ironic, therefore, when
the national chairperson of the ANC criticises members of the top brass for alleged ill
discipline.
Media accounts of fractures within COSATU have not materialised in any of the
items that we have perused. This blanket thinking is not only applicable to the
opinions rendered on public utilities, but also extends equally to the broad and popular
themes of privatisation. The earlier evidence that the present author has presented on
the consistency of the leadership requires mentioning here. The argument states that
the federation's position on restructuring and privatisation cannot be understood as
the result of government patronage. Similarly, there is little evidence to suggest that
these positions have been developed on the factory floor. These stable policy
positions were largely seen as the function of a capable and articulate leadership.
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of the ANC government requires not only formal knowledge of these positions, but
also how processes in the post-1994 period shaped these positions. COSATU provides
us with a self-diagnosis of the widening gap between the leaders and the rank-and-
file, and bemoans the loss of important political traditions of consultation. The most
recent conference saw COSATU leaders chastising themselves for allowing the gap to
develop between the leaders and the followers (COSATU Special Conference, 1999).
Journalists, who argue that grassroots support has felt more alienated in the last five
years of union activities and decisions, have echoed this diagnosis. A singular feature
of the post-1994 policy environment has been the uncertainty with which a broad
range of public sector employees had to contend with.
Teachers, health workers, public prosecutors and other government officials have
been left in the limbo while government struggled to deliver stable policy frames.
Local business, representatives of various governments, and sections of the newspaper
media consistently complained about the ambiguity of government policy on
privatisation (Wackernagel, 1997; Wadula, 1997; Chalmers and Grawitzky, 1999;
Smith, 1999). On the one hand, there was an affirmation of the importance of the
public sector in the NFA, while on the other hand, privatisation became one of the
pillars of new government policy. GEAR was introduced to the media as non-
negotiable, but later top officials in government said that the policy is not cast in
stone.
The point of the discussion is to indicate a climate of policy uncertainty in which
labour leaders had to operate. This unpredictable situation hardly facilitates the
possibility of extensive consultation by the union leaders of their various
constituencies. Extensive consultation of the rank-and-file requires stable policy
frames and this was hardly the case for unionists. The suspicion is that these dynamics
forced the leadership of COSATU to close in upon itself, and this is why we see the
repetition of consistent positions across all the items.
The dynamics of union decision making were therefore shaped not only by so-called
ideological considerations, but also by the prevailing policy environment after 1994.
These forces have not in the end fissured union leadership, but on the contrary, they
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seem more united, although it took leadership away from its grassroots support. We
should emphasise this point, because in explaining the policy positions of union
leadership, it will be too crass to suggest that ideological influence, and particularly
socialist influences are the pivot. Haggard and Kaufman's (1995) insistence that we
need to understand the institutional influence on policy positions is absolutely
relevant here. The data have given us a number of examples to support the idea that
COSATU leaders did not simply formulate a response to privatisation based purely on
socialist economics. The majority of the responses on the role of the state
acknowledge the role of the private sector in the economy. Union leaders clearly
indicated their preference for a mixed economy, and the modal response suggests a
proportionate contribution of the public- and the private sector.
The labour leaders also signalled their support for the employment creating function
of the private sector. The acceptance of the public sector as an important employer
does not seem to imply the destruction of the private sector in turn. The item on the
promotion of public works programmes can also be cited as further evidence that
unionists have conceived some important role for the private sector. Many of these
public works programmes rely not only on the capital contribution of the public
sector, but also on the promotion of public-private partnerships. It is impossible to
tell, from a consideration of the survey alone, if COSATU has held these finely tuned
positions prior to the struggle with government over privatisation. What is clear from
the items that we have considered, is that the federation's response sits somewhere
between a complete rejection of privatisation, and the pragmatics of compromise.
The policy on privatisation that COSATU adopted seemingly combines an ideological
opposition to privatisation and the acceptance of a pragmatic position on the
economy. Factored into this situation and impacting strongly on the policy positions
of COSATU is the capricious policy environment of the post-1994 period. The item
on the opposition to privatisation sees labour leaders as ideologically rejecting
privatisation. This situation, combined with an unpredictable policy environment has
propelled union leadership into defence, and this defence found its expression in the
unity of leadership on privatisation policies. Succinctly put, the unity of COSATU
leaders on a range of policy issues concerning privatisation is partly a function of the
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unstable policy environment. This does not mean that the policy response to
privatisation has been completely monolithic. The fact that the policy response
includes both pro-market and anti-market elements suggests some kind of bargaining
between possibly private sector and public sector unions in COSATU. It is only here
that the difference between the public and the private sector unions would emerge.
This difference has however been packaged, so that the final positions on privatisation
represent a compromise between these different unions in COSATU. This is as much
the claim of a National Union of Metal Workers' Union official (Gebhart, 1996).
When these policies are articulated, it does not distinguish between the public and the
private sector unions, but all COSATU leaders speak with one, albeit compromising
voice. This is why in spite of the differences between the private and the public
unions, the responses in the survey are near unanimous. In contrast to the unity in the
ranks ofCOSATU, the ANC is split on almost all of the items that we have covered in
the survey.
The first notable difference between the ANC and COSATU leaders is found in their
responses to GEAR. Whereas ANC leaders recognise an important place for neo-
liberal economics, COSATU leaders are positioned in the opposite. The ANC leaders
are not, however, consistent in terms of their acceptance of this economic framework.
These inconsistencies are first of all seen in the distribution of responses to the
privatisation of the public utilities. The ANC is divided between the nationalisers and
the privatisers of the public utilities. The privatisers reflect most likely the influence
of the growing African middle class in the ANC, whereas the nationalisers possibly
represent pockets of progressive left wing influences remaining in the organisation.
We should emphasise again that these two "groups" are not attached to COSATU or
the South African Communist Party. From the point of view of COSATU, those who
resist the privatisation of Spoornet, Telkom and Eskom are potential allies in the
alliance relationship. The only pattern that becomes visible in the opinions of leaders
of the ANC is that there is an almost even split on the support for the nationalisation
or privatisation of these concerns. The unambiguous transition from an acceptance of
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GEAR to the privatisation of the core state assets does not follow automatically for
ANC leaders. This inconsistency is not only applicable to the items on the public
utilities, but also to the privatisation index. Support for privatisation measured on this
index does not equal the solid acceptance of GEAR. There is here, in the opinion of
ANC leaders, a slight deviation from one of the core elements of the free market
economic orthodoxy, namely privatisation. Everything in the GEAR index points to
the reduction of the role of the state, but ANC leaders appear reluctant to take the
GEAR model to its logical end.
It is beyond the compass of the study to try and explain why the firm acceptance of
GEAR by the leaders of the ANC does not result in overwhelming support for
privatisation. It is, however, significant in terms of the strategic positions that
COSATU adopts. The mere fact that privatisation as an issue is not yet settled in the
ANC means that COSATU has a captive audience for its strong promotion of new
alliance structures.
These alliance structures would have the function of deliberating about contentious
issues, and would require ANC leadership to justify its policy decisions. COSATU
seems therefore to be pinning its hopes on precisely these leaders who would still be
willing to listen to alternative arguments on restructuring and privatisation. It is
therefore safe to assume that COSATU's latest strategy is not completely ungrounded
especially when we consider the data on the ANC leaders. In many of the single
privatisation items, the undecided group constitutes such a significant proportion, that
if committed, the opinions of the ANC would have a clearer pro- or anti-privatisation
flavour.
These are the dynamics that the federation hopes would deliver more socially
progressive policies on the restructuring and privatisation of state enterprises. This
said, the growing confidence of the African middle class, and its continuing
affirmation by ANC leadership, could still render COSATU'S strategy vulnerable.
Many political commentators are already suggesting that the current ANC leadership
has begun to develop strong social links with the growing African middle class and
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bourgeoisie (Marais, 1999: 68). This new social class could potentially serve as a
buffer and so prevent the development of more benign policies on privatisation. In
fact, one can argue that if the march of this new group is not arrested, the ANC may
emerge very soon as principally behind the whole privatisation drive. This comes out
clearly in the item that states that "Trade unions should do all that is in their power to
oppose privatisation." The majority of the ANC rejects this statement (64%, N=137).
A meagre 18.2% of the respondents agrees with the statement, and it is the opinion of
the present author, that together with the response on the TELKOM variable, the
presence of pro-market thinking is unmistakable. It is difficult to tell why a pro-
privatisation position appears so evident in these two items, and in particular the
response on the TELKOM variable.
Both the ESKOM and SPOORNET variables still maintained much of the tension
between the opposing camps, but it is decidedly dissolved with the TELKOM
variable. It may, perhaps, have something to do with the nature of the industry, and
the potential business opportunities that it presents. This will remain speculation but it
does not significantly detract from the overall pattern of splits in the ANC.
The central question of the assignment is the elucidation of the policy positions that
COSATU took on privatisation and restructuring. The analysis has suggested that a
mere substantive or formal understanding of these positions is not sufficient. The
institutional policy climate of uncertainty has also contributed to the current posture
of the COSATU leadership. This led to a situation where the leadership of the
federation took it upon itself to work out positions that escaped the vagary of
government thinking at the time. This is why such a profound unity is registered with
all of the responses on the items that we have examined. The concession COSATU
made with regards to partial privatisation has been explained as the result of sustained
pressure from business, political parties and above all, the electoral dominance of the
ANC.
The other contributing factor has been the shift of thinking that took place in the
larger private sector unions. This is one of the principal reasons why the COSATU
response includes both an ideological rejection of privati sation and an acceptance of
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the role of the private sector. These differences have however not been allowed to
rupture official policy positions, and it remains remarkable that this policy consensus
is reflected in the empirical data that we have analysed. In short, these institutional
and organisational dynamics have produced the uniform responses that characterise
the opinions of COSATU leaders in the survey. This description contains only one of
the factors of the proposed theory of Levitsky and Way, namely electoral dominance.
The other four factors in this framework have not produced enough conceptual
leverage to literally explain the privatisation positions of the federation. This
assignment takes the position that the policy positions of COSATU can be explained
by at least three factors.
The policy uncertainty in the post-1994 period pushed COSATU leadership into a
situation where they adopted policies on privatisation that transcended the specifics of
anyone situation. This is why these policies have such a fundamental orientation,
and why it does not easily respond to short-term pressures like union competition. The
second factor, namely organisational dynamics enables us to understand the policies
of COSATU as compromises between the different unions in the federation. The
result is the compromised positions that we saw in the attitudes of COSATU leaders.
These responses include both an ideological rejection of privatisation and an
acceptance of the role of the private sector. These compromised positions are however
articulated in a uniform manner by COSATU leaders as we saw in the survey.
The third factor, namely the electoral or party strength of the ANC will be discussed
in the following section. We note here in passing that the electoral strength of the
ANC has catapulted COSATU into an acceptance of the need to continue its
negotiations with government. Finally, the present author is arguing that although the
differences in the ANC are revealing and extremely important, the significant point of
difference is located between party and trade union federation. There is little evidence
in the survey, and in the present relationship between party and federation, to
convince the present author that these differences are simply "tactical" as Patrick
Lekota seems to believe. Concluding this section on this note, we are now ready to
answer the question on the future of privatisation in South Africa.
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"Such intercourse between the ANC and pockets of capital promises to further
strengthen the power of the ANC, since the accumulation potential of African
capitalists would be mediated by their standing with the ruling party. This along with
the ANC's redeployment offigures into theparastatals andprivate sectors, potentially
has the makings of a new elite stratum dependent on a network of businesslpolitical
links" (Marais, 1999: 69) [My emphasis].
4.3 The Future of Privatisation in South Africa
This section will attempt to examine the future of privatisation from the point of view
of Levitsky and Way's theory. Thereafter, the emphasis is going to be on the most
recent privatisation plans of government and its significance for the future of
privatisation. The following section will assess the future of privatisation in the
context of the third research proposition.
4.3.1 The Context of Privatisation
Four of the five variables in Levitsky and Way's framework have not enabled us with
the necessary leverage to understand COSATU's present policy position. The failure
to predict past and current policies does not mean that it is completely incapable of
delivering some insights into potential trends in the future. The nub of the theory is to
situate the response of labour within both a material and an institutional context. We
will now look at each of the variables to purchase us the luxury of a prediction of the
future of privatisation.
The assignment has argued that there are very few significant social linkages, if any,
between party and labour to facilitate a common understanding of privatisation. Even
if this were to be the case, then these so-called linkages have not prevented the
immense tension and distance between labour and party on privatisation. The data
have shown that policy differences on GEAR are large, and it is very difficult to
imagine a rapprochement here. All indications are that new relationships are
developing in the ANC so that social linkages are now built between party leaders and
key figures in industry. Many of these key figures have been re-deployed into the
public enterprises with the explicit mandate of restructuring it:
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Much of this reduces the explanatory impact of social linkages in enabling us to
understand how COSATU may react to privatisation plans in the future. Social
linkages are in reality idea linkages as this assignment argued earlier, but it is the
interpretation of the same idea or ideals that lies at the heart of the conflict:
"The reality is- if we want to talk about a site of struggle to ensure that we have a
developmental state, this is where it is going to happen [the reduction of the size of
the public sector}. Ifyou talk about failure for this new government, this is also where
it is going to happen" (Fraser-Moleketi in Bell, 1999:20) [My insertion].
This reflection by the Minister of Public Service and Administration concerns the
same idea of the developmental state, but her interpretation implies that the public
sector needs to be trimmed. She believes it is only when you have a lean and efficient
state sector that you can talk about delivery. COSATU, in emphasising the same
notion of the developmental state, does not believe that public sector employment
should be reduced if you are serious about delivery. This point reinforces the view
that seemingly similar ideas held by the ANC and COSATU are interpreted in
different ways, and this gives rise to the conflicting strategies advocated by each of
the parties. With this situation, no amount of social linkages can possibly explain
COSATU's position on privatisation.
The second factor, party strength has retained its significance, because it does not
appear likely that the ANC is going to be unseated quickly. This means that the
bargaining around privatisation will continue to take place between the ANC and
COSATU. There is therefore always a possibility of political trade-offs that may slow
down the pace of privatisation. A classic example here is the local elections of 2000.
We should not expect any major talks now about restructuring and privatisation of
SPOORNET and TELKOM, or ideas about the impending job losses associated with
it. At the same time, government will in its own way continue the privatisation
programme, but steering it safely away from the contentious state enterprises. The
assignment has also argued that leadership overlap is not so significant in enabling us
to understand the position of COSATU.
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After all, the Ministers of Public Enterprise and Public Service and Administration are
members of the South African Communist Party. COSATU has not completely
pinned its hopes on leadership overlap, but more so on securing greater influence in
places where actual policy decisions are made. This, together with the fact that the
ANC is slowly moving towards a pro-privatisation position, makes it less strategically
significant to secure leadership overlap in the ANC. This is not to deny that leadership
overlap is completely irrelevant, but the policy dynamics of the last five years are
pointing to the need for new policy making units. Debates about leadership overlap,
as a way of mutually influencing the position of government and union on
privatisation, are likely to become irrelevant.
The fourth factor, union competition is still in its infant stage, and it would be
foolhardy to suggest that COSATU has become more radical since the advent of trade
union federations like FEDUSA. The dynamics of its policy formation process are not
yet responding to the presence of other federations. There have been no major
changes in its policy since the advent of stiffer competition with other trade union
federations. It is therefore unlikely that this factor would have a material impact on
current and future policy position of COSATU. This is partly ascribed to the
fundamental positions that COSATU adopted, and as the analysis indicated, these
positions do not easily respond to short-term factors.
Finally, COSATU leadership has made calls for a return to the values of consultation
with the rank-and-file. The suggestion by Levitsky and Way is that if union leaders
are more driven by their mass base, then this is likely to radicalise its position on
economic reform. The current policy positions of COSATU have been maintained for
the last four years, and unless there is aforce majeure, it is expected that the policies
will retain its current character. From both a retrospective and a prospective point of
view, the theory of Levitsky and Way (1998) is inadequate in elucidating the policy
positions of COSATU on privatisation. Policy instability, bargaining between
COSATU affiliated unions and the electoral strength of the ANC are the chief factors
explaining the policy positions ofCOSATU.
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Pressure from business and the opposition political parties have .intensified the
pressure on the federation, but should not be regarded as the primary reasons for
COSATU'S policies. In the final section, we are going to examine the most recent
privatisation plans of government and speculate on its significance for the future of
privatisation in South Africa.
4.3.2 Privatisation: Co-operation or Opposition?
Government announced recently the latest privatisation package. This includes the
flotation of TELKOM by 2001 and a further 5% sale of the telecommunication
operator (Chalmers, 1999; Mail and Guardian, 6 December 1999)_21 Four preferred
bidders have been identified for the state's commercial forests and the sale of South
African Special Risks Association (SASRIA). In addition, several of Denel's interests
would be placed on the market (Chalmers, 1999). Government officials made it clear
that Mbeki sees the acceleration of privatisation as an important priority. These
announcements should be read with the earlier statements by the Minister of Public
Enterprise that a legislative framework is in the offing.
The purpose of all these measures is to lend more security and stability to the
government's policy of privatisation. Radebe said that these measures are intended to
lay down the rules for both national and international players, and to provide certainty
for the way forward (Chalmers, 1999). This move clearly has the purpose of
answering some of the concerns around policy stability, but it appears to the present
author to be more of a gesture towards national and international business. Both these
components complained bitterly about government's putative lack of direction in this
field. This policy clarity does not necessarily extend to organised labour as well. None
of these plans has major labour implications, and there is no mentioning of
SPOORNET'S and TELKOM'S retrenchment predicament.
21 Almost a week after these announcements, cabinet decided that the four major parastatals are going
to be restructured. These announcements took care not to mention "privatisation", and it involves
mostly structural changes to the mentioned state enterprises (Chalmers, 1999). The planned job losses
at Telkom and Spoomet have not been approved. This is lending further support to the position of the
assignment that government is preparing for talks with organised labour.
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These new plans do not therefore have as its primary target organised labour and the
problems and obstacles of the last three months. Government is strategically playing
its cards to pacify important sections of business, especially black business and at the
same time, postponing the difficult talks with labour. A measure of this strategy is the
situation at TRANSNET, where the latest reports of the parastatal indicate serious
losses, but addressing these concerns head on may not be good politics, especially
with the looming local elections.
The Minister of Public Enterprises' intervention in the SPOORNET debacle signalled
government's essentially conciliatory stance towards organised labour. Both Radebe
and his spokesperson, Nordien, reiterated the fact that no final decision has been taken
on retrenchment at SPOORNET and TELKOM. These earlier interventions and recent
plans might be interpreted as preparing the way for genuine discussions between
labour and government on the contested issues at TELKOM and SPOORNET. What
is the nature of these talks likely to be?
COSATU has consistently affirmed the importance of the alliance relationship, and it
is improbable that they would not be supporting the ANC in the 2000 local elections.
This may introduce the opportunity for tradeoffs between federation and party. The
items on the agenda are likely to be the new regulations on labour flexibility, the
introduction of NFA II, and of course the situation at the four major parastatals.
Government has been under pressure from black empowerment groups to relax the
"stringent" labour laws and to open the labour market for greater flexibility to enable
budding entrepreneurs to survive (Marais, 1999). Mbeki's latest statement calling for
the strengthening of the African business class means that government is less likely to
make concessions in this area.
If we believe the reports on the state of TELKOM and SPOORNET, then some of
these massive retrenchments are inevitable. The sensitive nature of the labour
situation at these two state enterprises, however, means that no short-term and radical
decisions are going to be taken by government. Government officials kept on
repeating this assurance to organised labour. It is the opinion of the present author that
government is going to pursue privatisation in all the other areas mentioned, but that it
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
90
would refrain from vigorously privati sing at SPOORNET, TELKOM and maybe even
ESKOM. This would give the necessary assurance to the private sector, while using
this time to engage labour on TELKOM and SPOORNET. This time period is also
likely to coincide with the development of the much feted privatisation legislation.
There is a good possibility that the current losses at SPOORNET might be cross-
subsidised with some of the estimated Rlbillion fiscal gains from the recent sales_22
The privatisation legislation approved by parliament would give the present
government greater political clout to deal with the retrenchment situation at the
affected state enterprises. With the current pace of the restructuring programme
picking up, COSATU could be faced with a very unfriendly political environment,
then.
The essence of the talks between government and labour, however, is surely going to
be on the introduction of an NFA II. These two players would have entirely different
reasons why a commitment to NFA II would be paramount. COSATU believes that
the current NFA approach is simply the change of ownership instead of internal
restructuring at the work place. The federation has been calling for the renewal of the
NFA and for its focus to be extended beyond mere consultation (COSATU Special
Congress, 1999).
The new NFA must reflect the role that state enterprises should play in job creation as
outlined in the RDP and the Presidential Job Summit. The federation has demanded
that the NFA should outline the areas not for privatisation, and the conversion of the
NFA into legislation to be made imperative. The NFA represents for COSATU an
active attempt to influence the privatisation agenda, and if necessary at all costs, to
slow down and constrain the process. Government has indicated its willingness to talk
about the possibility of an NFA II, but its reasons may communicate different
objectives. Jeff Radebe has in fact castigated management at SPOORNET for not
following the processes set out in the NFA.
22 The most recent plans include giving R800 million to Transnet from the RI.4 billion sale of 20% of
SAA to Swissair. It is believed that management at Transnet is going to be given carte blanche to deal
with its debt situation (Chalmers, 1999)
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The reality is that the NFA represents the only decent and non-conflicting way of
discussing the hard realities of privatisation. Government's current experience with
the NFA might give it enough confidence that important concessions can be wrought
from COSATU. The non-privatisation areas that COSATU outlined are amongst
others telecommunications, public transport and electricity. This is precisely where
the current problems are located. Government is unlikely to concede to the full
demands, because the deteriorating situation at SPOORNET would surely force its
hand. Concessions could be made with the privatisation legislation, because there is
no reason why COSATU"S proposed NFA cannot be synthesised with new
privatisation legislation.
It is nigh impossible that a new wave of restructuring measures is going to be
negotiated in the absence of concerns about employment. Agreements are likely to be
negotiated around the size and timing of the job losses. The new legislation may
stipulate the precise conditions under which retrenchments would be inevitable, and
COSATU is expected to push for measures to constrain management to unilaterally
take these decisions. The essential purpose of the new round of negotiations would be
to extend the same policy stability to the affected parastaIs. The policy instability that
organised labour faced on restructuring and privatisation is not going to be resolved
unless the talks about an NFA II commence.
Until such time, the positions of COSATU on restructuring and privatisation are
going to remain the same, and with the local election imminent, the federation's
confidence about its positions will be evident. The governing party's electoral
dominance means that COSATU will be committed, and not only in the proposed
NFA talks, to negotiation about privatisation. It is naïve to believe that these talks are
going to leave the federation untouched, but it may represent it with an opportunity to
constrain the privatisation drive of government. One stark reality that we cannot avoid
is the fact that COSATU is not going to emerge from the talks with a completely
changed position on the opposition to wholesale privatisation and the privatisation of
core state assets.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
92
It may concede to retrenchments under very specific conditions, but it is the feeling of
the present author that the federation will stand or fall on its stated privatisation
policies. The NFA talks are unlikely to lead to the shedding of the notion of the
developmental state. The chances are therefore good that the state will emerge after
these talks as the major shareholder, but COSATU may conceive some role for
private capital. Its current policy already acknowledges the importance of the private
sector, albeit cautiously, but it is unlikely to agree to the state losing majority shares
in the affected parastatals.
All of these dynamics are indicative of COSATU'S essentially "co-operative"
character, and the federation is not predicted to principally oppose privatisation in all
its forms. The pockets of "opposition" in COSATU are localised and do not reflect
the current position on privatisation that includes both pragmatic and ideological
elements. It arrived at these positions after much deliberation, and for the sake of the
internal unity of the organisation, it is predicted that these positions would remain the
basis of discussions with government. What COSATU would not however be able to
prevent is retrenchment. It is immaterial whether the affected state enterprises are
going to remain in state hands, but the planned restructuring necessitates
retrenchments.
In conclusion then, it is the opinion of the present author that COSATU would not
fundamentally change its current position in the short- or long term. This firmness of
its position does not mean that it is not amenable to discussion with government on
privatisation. These talks are unlikely to lead to a sea change in its positions, but the
spectre of unemployment for its members is unavoidable. The essence of the talks on
restructuring and privatisation is going to be concerns about distributing the social and
economic costs of restructuring. Alternatively, much of the discussions are going to
be focused on remedies to deal with the fate of the unemployed. New legislation is
predicted to include the latter as well as the conditions under which retrenchment
would be applicable.f
23 The meeting to discuss the possible tradeoffs between the alliance partners fmally came. The role of
the ANC as the dominant partner in the alliance was confirmed, but it had to make a number of
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It is now possible to assess the third proposition that states "If there is a positive
relationship between party and union, then privatisation is going to be expedited. If
the relationship is negative, ensuing obstacles will slow down the pace of
privatisation. "
The proposition combines the status of the alliance relationship with the timing or
pace of the privatisation programme. The pace of the privatisation programme was
uneven in the last five years. It oscillated from the bold announcements of
privatisation in 1995 to the slowness of concluding single privatisation transactions.
The two rival explanations for this situation are the lack of capacity in the Department
of Public Enterprise and the opposition from trade union federations. The first
explanation does not carry much weight, because if government were serious about
privatisation, the relevant department would have been bolstered. The fact that
government has now upgraded the status of the Department of Public Enterprise does
not mean that a new seriousness and purpose has suddenly set in.
The more likely explanation relates to the governing party's relationship with its
labour ally, COSATU. The assignment has indicated how opposition to the initial
announcements led to the NFA. The recent fracas at Transnet confirmed the centrality
of the NFA as a tool that has been used by COSATU and other federations to slow
down privatisation. The most recent talks between the ANC, SACP and COSATU
again invoked privatisation in the context of the alliance relationship. It is clear from
the above that the destiny of privatisation in South Africa is inseparable from the
alliance relationship. There is also no doubt that the relationship has been subject to
much strain, and it effectively blocked the smooth progress of privatisation policies.
This evidence leads the present author to assert that the negative relationship between
the ANC and COSATU has definitely slowed down the implementation of
privatisation programmes, and so brings us to a confirmation of the third proposition.
concessions (Haffejee, 1999). These include state funding for a comprehensive plan for retrenched
workers and a national political centre as a new alliance structure. In return, COSATU and the SACP
would support Mbeki's drive for the development of the African bourgeoisie, public-private
partnerships and the "restructuring" of state enterprises. It should be noted that this was a meeting of
alliance leaders and that many of the tradeoffs must still be given formal negotiating position and
shape, and this is where the future NFA II talks between party and federation would be significant.
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4.4 Summary
The outstanding feature of the data on the opinions of labour leaders shows that
COSATU leaders are united across a range of privatisation related issues. The data
also show the fundamental rejection of GEAR by COSATU leaders. It has been
argued that this unity is not simply an ideological unity, but represents the views of
the major affiliates ofCOSATU. This united position ofCOSATU has been explained
as the result of three different factors. The inchoate character of government's policies
in the post-1994 period led the federation to search for more enduring alternatives.
The unity in the opinions of COSATU leaders does not preclude a mix of ideological
fervour and a pragmatic stance towards privatisation. This has been ascribed to the
bargaining between the different affiliates in the federation. Both the overall
institutional policy climate after 1994 and organisational dynamics have contributed
to the position of COSATU on restructuring and privatisation.
In contrast to COSATU, the ANC appears to be fissured on especially the
privatisation of core state assets and privatisation. ANC leaders have however firmly
endorsed the macro-economic policy Gear. A particularly troubling aspect of the data
on the ANC leaders has been the transition from Gear to privatisation. Whereas Gear
has been strongly accepted, the opinions of ANC leaders on privatisation are deeply
divided. This assignment has approached this point purely in terms of the strategic
vistas that it opens for COSATU. The essentially unsettled nature of the ANC leaders'
opinions on privatisation means that COSATU may have an audience in the ANC
after all.
Government's recent restructuring announcements seem more intent in reducing the
uncertainty of privatisation policies. The main beneficiaries of this process are
national and international business. The difficult talks with labour seem to have been
postponed in spite of the recent alliance meeting. The assignment has argued that
government is going to pursue a privatisation programme that does not include the
full restructuring and privatisation of the large utilities. Negotiations on the
establishment of an NFA, or something similar in nature, are going to be opened soon,
and it is here that the crux of the issues is going to be addressed. The most important
issues would be the decision-making powers of management, and the conditions
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under which retrenchments would take place. New legislation would detail these
conditions as well as the remedies for the unemployed. COSATU is unlikely to
emerge from the talks with a completely different position, but the assignment has
argued that the federation would not be able to prevent the inevitable fact of job
losses. The electoral dominance of the ANC has been hypothesised as binding
COSATU to negotiations, and in the end, explaining the federation's essentially "co-
operative" strategy. The final chapter will speculate briefly on some of the latest
developments and suggests topics for future research.
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24 See note 22 for the latest position on Transnet's debt.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Government has just announced its latest restructuring and privatisation plans for the
four major parastatals, Eskom, Transnet, Telkom and Denel (Chalmers, 1999). Eskom
is to be unbundled into three separate businesses and Spoornet will also be
restructured into three stand-alone businesses. A significant part of Transnet's debt is
going to be taken over by government to allow the enterprise to continue with the
privatisation of its subsidiaries.r" The management proposals at Transnet to retrench
27 000 workers have not been approved, but it is believed that the voluntary
retrenchments are continuing (Chalmers, 1999).
In addition, government has promised the publication of a comprehensive policy
framework for the restructuring of the concerned state enterprises. It also promised
that the national social plan would perforce be aligned with the transformation process
at the state enterprises. Finally, government has indicated that private sector
involvement is going to be increased in the affected public enterprises. Do these new
plans significantly depart from the predictions made in the previous chapter?
The assignment has predicted that there are not going to be big talks about the
restructuring and privatisation of the big parastatals. Government has just done the
opposite, and it would appear as if the prediction does not fit the reality. The reality is
that government has yet again fallen short of committing itself to full restructuring or
privatisation of the parastatals. The structural changes that are considered do not mean
that we have a major transferral of state property to private investors. The intention is
merely to position these concerns to allow it to focus on its so-called core functions.
COSATU's insistence on the developmental role of the state is still intact, and it is
unlikely that these new measures are going to fundamentally reduce the state's share
in these enterprises. The assignment has also predicted that inasmuch as the federation
is not going to prevent retrenchments, the proposed 27 000 jobs at Spoornet would not
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be lost either. The looming local elections make this kind of action politically risky.
Government has not approved the proposed job losses at Spoornet, thus confirming
the sensitivities around the Spoornet situation. Another prediction was that no new
wave of restructuring measures is going to take place in the absence of concerns about
employment. In this regard, government has indicated that it would align the social
plan with the transformation process at the affected state enterprises. It expressed
concerns about the social and economic burdens of unemployment resulting from
restructuring. These concerns were evident when Spoornet announced the massive job
cuts that it intended to implement.
Government has also indicated that it intends to publish a comprehensive policy
framework for the restructuring of the state enterprises. It goes without saying that
this framework is far from being the new law, and it would only be given final form
after discussions with labour. The present author interprets this as government's basic
positions that will be negotiated with COSATU and other federations. The only
feature of the new policy announcements that was not predicted is the unbundling of
Eskom and Spoornet. Discussions with labour will be focused here as well, because
this re-positioning of these concerns is likely to lead to job losses. In short, there is
nothing in the new announcements to affect a change in the position of COSATU on
restructuring and privatisation.
These announcements were followed by a meeting of the alliance leaders with the aim
of resolving the differences around government's economic policy (Randall, 1999).
The significance of the meeting lies in the agreement to form a new structure that will
have the function of dealing with the differences in the alliance. Randall (1999) feels
that the new structure would, paradoxically, concentrate power in the hands of ANC
leadership.f The new structure has as its first responsibility to co-ordinate the holding
of a full and formal alliance meeting. This lends more credence to the fact that
25 Incidentally, Steven Friedman of the Centre for Policy Studies feels that the new structure is simply
going to paper over differences, unless the positions of the meeting are sold to ordinary members (in
Randall, 1999). We can note in passing that internal dynamics within COSATU focused precisely
around leadership and not ordinary members. Selling the positions to ordinary members is not the main
issue, but it is the nature of future discussions and formal agreements between party and federation that
are crucial.
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leadership overlap is not the decisive factor in influencing policy positions. COSATU
and the SACP consented to the restructuring drive of the government, but as yet, no
details are known about what this means. If government emerges from these meetings
and negotiations stronger, then some of the factors in the theory of Levitsky and Way
(1998) might become more important. There is no doubt that the party strength of the
ANC contributes massively to its ability to wring concessions from its alliance
partners. It is highly unlikely that COSATU would eventually fully capitulate, but if it
does that, then union competition will definitely come to the fore. It will be facile for
trade union federations like NACTU to convince workers that COSATU's alliance
with the government is going to exact huge costs and sacrifices from them. This can
bring about a similar scenario as in Poland where deals with the governing party have
substantially vitiated the position of Solidarity Union.
COSATU leaders would be aware of this, and this will only intensify the nature of the
battles that must still be fought. The gentlemanly spirit that apparently permeated the
alliance meeting bears virtually no relation to the rough patches that lie ahead. These
are all the factors that would bear on the genuine discussions between government
and COSATU on the finer details of restructuring. Our interests in these new
developments are purely based on the question if these latest developments have the
capacity to change the federation's position on privatisation and restructuring.
COSATU support for Mbeki' s cultivation of an African business class means the
further easing of existing labour legislation for small black businesses.
Although it is an important concession, it does not deal directly with the situation at
the four big state enterprises. The further easing of the basic conditions of
employment for small businesses, in return for welfare's expedition of an income
support grant, does not change much either. The real deal is the federation's support
of "restructuring'r" for which it won a comprehensive social plan for retrenched
workers. If government is to be believed that it wants to minimise job losses at the
26 Apart from the structural changes at Eskom and Spoornet, and the new management contract for
Denel, little else is known about the proposed restructuring. We do not know the nature and size of the
job losses, nor are we told about the time frames of restructuring. The observer is also not told if these
concerns are restructured with a view towards their eventual privatisation.
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parastatals, why has it bothered to gain COSATU's consent for restructuring? This
only reinforces the view of the present author that job losses are inevitable, but
COSATU now has to deal with what number it considers acceptable. It is the opinion
of the present author that agreement on this will be sought in the social plan for the
retrenched workers. This plan is likely to be made consistent with the Skills
Development Act of 1998 and redeployment proposals.f If government and COSATU
cannot find agreement here, or in the new structure, then there is not likely to be an
agreement in the first place.
The latest situation is also a powerful reminder of the "co-operative" dynamic, which
binds COSATU to informal and formal talks with the government. It is the opinion of
the present author that until such discussions about restructuring are held, the position
of COSATU will remain the same. This is an opportune moment then to restate the
questions that guided this present inquiry. The first question aimed at explaining the
positions that COSATU took on restructuring and privatisation. The inquiry led us in
the end, not only to a formal understanding of these positions, but also to the
dynamics of decision-making in the federation. The formal understanding of these
policies brought to the fore the opposition to wholesale privatisation and the
opposition to the privatisation of the core state assets.
This opposition did not emerge in any patchy manner in the survey, but exhibited a
unity and consistency in both congress resolutions and the opinions of leaders in the
survey. Both the formal policies and the unity it expressed were argued to be a
function of the prevailing policy environment in the post-1994 period. The policy
uncertainty on privatisation led to a situation where the federation's leadership was
forced to develop policy positions that went beyond the vagaries of government
27 The Skills Development Act of 1998 provides for sectoral training authorities whose function is the
training and re-training of workers. The idea is to absorb a mass of workers who are currently
employed, and with retrenchments looming, to give workers more skills. The emphasis is on the
flexibility of worker skills, or multi-skilling to increase their chances of fmding alternative
employment.
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thinking. This is why the present author has referred to it as fundamental policies,
because they have been shown not to respond to short-term pressures. Neither so-
called social linkages, leadership overlap, trade union competition nor dependence on
the rank-and-file has changed the complexity of these policies in the last four years. In
spite of the challenges of the latest developments, COSATU is unlikely to shed its
current policy stances. In this, it would be aided by the present legal and political
machinery, which enable casualties of restructuring to be re-absorbed into the
workplace. The unity of these positions has been attributed to the bargaining that took
place between the various affiliated unions in COSATU. The compromise resulting
from the bargaining makes it possible to discern both pro- and anti-privatisation
forces present in congress resolutions and the opinions in the survey. The crucial point
to take away here is that leadership has not allowed these differences to fracture the
federation, and this is why the policies come out consistently in the opinions of
COSATU leaders.
The dynamics of policy uncertainty and the bargaining that took place in COSATU
have produced the policy positions that COSATU adopted. An important factor that
has emerged here is the fact that public sector unions are now the largest component
in COSATU. After five years in government, the ANC government is now facing a
united federation with very strong public sector unions in its midst. The second
question examined the essential posture of the movement in terms of its willingness to
engage the governing party. The assignment has argued that the ANC's electoral
dominance or party strength has bound COSATU to negotiation and bargaining. The
same situation would perhaps not have existed if the ANC were not able to command
such a majority of the votes.
Party strength is not likely to disappear in the near future, and it is the contention of
the present author that the federation's "co-operative" dynamic will continue. This
translates into a policy position that is not absolutely opposed to privatisation, and that
tries to seek some common ground for the contributions of both the public sector and
the private sector. The commitment to negotiation does not mean that the federation is
at any minute ready to abandon its policy positions, because these positions have
guided it for the last five years, and are unlikely to change quickly. There are
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significant pockets of opposition in COSATU, but leadership has been able to
navigate all the different constituencies into the acceptance of unity in the federation.
It is remarkable that after five years of wrangling with government on the issue of
privatisation, COSATU seems finally able to have convinced government to consider
the costs of privatisation. It could not have achieved this without the instrumental role
of leadership, which has literally guided the ship in the last five years. COSATU
leadership has not only constrained the privatisation drive, but it also succeeded in
welding together disparate forces in its own ranks. The price that leadership had to
pay for its successes is its alienation from the rank-and-file. The drive to re-connect
with its membership is unlikely to alter its current positions, and ironically, it will go
into negotiations with the full backing of its neglected constituency.
Privatisation will remain a contested issue in the future, and recent optimism about the
restructuring of the big parastatals is not enough to obviate the challenges that lie
ahead. Government, because of its narrow focus on privatisation, has not succeeded in
developing a productivity consciousness in the public sector and the private sector.
The enduring tussle between it and COSATU has created the false impression that the
economy is dependent on a change of ownership in order to improve and to deliver
greater employment. There are positive signs that the governing party no longer treats
Gear as a shibboleth, and COSATU has begun to accept some inevitable economic
realities. These new postures of party and union are now making it possible to look
beyond mere labels, and to genuinely find ways of reviving the employment creating
ability of the South African economy.
5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH
COSATU has for long pinned its hopes on new alliance structures. One possible
question to explore is what would happen to COSA TU's basic position on
privatisation if the vaunted new national political centre were successful? How would
the policy positions respond to strategies of co-option? Another angle of interest is the
relationship between the leaders and the rank-and-file. What levels of concessions
would the rank-and-file deem as acceptable, and would deep concessions to
government lead to discontent amongst the rank-and-file? Would the rank-and-file
prefer to voice their discontent through COSATU, or any of the other trade union
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federations? Linked to this is the attempt of COSATU leadership planning a "return"
to the importance of the rank-and-file. If we accord the planned future talks the status
it deserves, then enormous strain is inevitable. Government would use the planned
talks to negotiate a fundamental package with its alliance partners. This requires
compromise at precisely a moment the trade union federation plans to become
sensitive to the concerns of the rank-and-file. The demands of negotiating in good
faith with the government might be at odds with the basic concerns of COSATU's
members.
The assignment has repeatedly made mention of the unity in the ranks of COSATU
leadership. Another question to explore is to examine the mechanisms and processes
that made this unity possible. This has obvious significance in terms of leadership in a
society in transition. Finally, will the future talks between the alliance leaders
fundamentally slow down privatisation and even change the direction of the
programme? Are there any indications that government is moving more firmly to
COSATU's preferred private-public partnerships as a way of changing the direction of
privatisation? These are only some of the questions that future research needs to
grapple with, because it is clear that the last bridge in the privatisation debate is yet to
be crossed.
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